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Research indicates that although children as young as two years of age are able to use 
proper names to track individuals across change, tracking identity across hypothetical brain 
transplants and magical transfers of mind is a later developmental achievement. Additionally, the 
value implications of naming have not been studied. The present research examined children’s 
ability to use proper names to track individuals in contrast to mind and labels, and their 
understanding of the value implications of proper names. Study 1a examined identity tracking 
and irreplaceable value judgments of a named stuffed animal or toy car in contrast to an identical 
toy bearing a category label or the experimenter’s toy. Study 1b examined four- and seven-year-
old children’s ability to track identity across a magical transfer using proper names and mind. 
Study 2 examined the ability of children and adults to use proper names versus trait labels to 
track identity across transfers differing in degree of ontological distance (person, dog, stone). 
Also, effects of label type and category on irreplaceable value judgments were considered. The 
results indicated that 4-year-olds successfully track the identity of a named toy and this ability 
continues to develop with age. Four-year-olds presented with a magical transfer scenario were 
able to track identity but not subjective aspects of identity, across a transfer, using proper names. 
Whereas 7-year-olds were able to use proper names, mind, and trait label equally well to track 
subjective identity, 4-year-olds performed better with mind than with either proper name or trait 
label. The results suggest that with age, children increasingly associate proper names with 
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 v 
subjective identity. In addition, older children were less likely than younger children to respond 
that an old and worn toy bearing a proper name should be replaced. Children also judged more 
often that a toy car was replaceable than a stuffed elephant. When presented with magical 
transfer scenarios, adults judged subjective identity as irreplaceably valuable more often than 
participants in either of the child groups. However, there was no evidence that proper names, in 
contrast to mind and trait labels, uniquely influenced judgments of irreplaceable value of 
subjective identity.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The sister of a friend of mine has a doll named Jill. This doll is missing most of its hair and has 
an arm that occasionally falls off. My friend asked his sister why she doesn’t just get rid of the 
doll. To that question she responded, “But it’s Jill!” My friend’s sister does not care that her doll 
is falling apart and not much to look at. What matters is that it is her doll that she has had for a 
long time. She and that doll have a history, a relationship. However, the relationship is not just 
about mere ownership. Her utterance of the doll’s name marked its value to her and served as 
justification for hanging on to it. To her, that doll is irreplaceable; it’s Jill. This anecdote raises 
several questions concerning the connection between naming and identity. What role does the 
doll’s name, Jill, play in the tracking of her identity across changes (like the loss of an arm)? 
Beyond allowing for the tracking of dolls and people, can proper names serve as vehicles for 
identity, especially the immaterial identity associated with mind or soul? Additionally, what role 
does the doll’s name play in marking or conferring value to the doll and thus making Jill 
irreplaceable? 
Proper names serve two distinct and important functions, keeping track of individuals and 
marking or conferring value on individuals. Proper names help establish the individual identities 
of things that are important to recognize as unique individuals, individuals that are important for 
us to keep track of. In addition, a proper name allows for tracking of individual identity across 
time and situations, as well as across changes of varying degrees and in all possible worlds 
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(Kripke, 1980). Proper names pick out individuals from among the crowds. In the social world it 
is important to keep track of individual people across changes and names assist in this task. 
Proper names serve an important purpose in identity when it comes to official records like 
medical, academic, and legal documentation.  
However, not just anything receives a proper name. Proper names tend to be given to types of 
things and entities that we deem important as individuals, most notably, people. We are 
motivated to keep track of things and people that we value as irreplaceable on account of their 
uniqueness, their individuality. Having a proper name is so significant for people that, according 
to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child established in 1989, the right to a 
name is considered a fundamental right of a child (Hall, 1999). Thus proper names are seen by 
adults, and even institutionalized, as a significant component of a human being. In this way, 
proper names bring attention to the potential value of an entity, what makes it important as an 
individual and thus irreplaceable, since there is no one else exactly like that individual. 
Although the giving of proper names to people is universal and even considered a human 
right, cultural variation in naming practices does occur with striking consequences in terms of 
both tracking and value. Cultural practices highlight the value-laden nature of the conferral of 
proper names. The defining characteristics of proper names lead to important effects of naming 
or not naming. Knowing someone’s name, using someone’s name, validates the existence of that 
person as an important individual who is irreplaceable and enables that valued person to be 
tracked in the social world. The anthropological literature suggests that naming practices play an 
important role in the creation or denial of personhood that has consequences for how those on the 
margins, such as the soon-to-be or newly born, and the recently dead, are thought of and 
subsequently treated (Layne, 2006; Vom Bruck & Bodenhorn, 2006). As demonstrated in this 
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research, the practice of conferring a proper name highlights irreplaceable value by bringing 
attention to the individual personhood of a being and the potential that goes along with that. 
The developmental psychology literature suggests that even babies have some understanding 
of proper names as referring the individuals and this understanding continues to develop during 
early childhood (Garcia-Ramirez & Shatz, 2011; Hall, 2009). Infants as young as 4.5 months 
recognize their names in contrast to other words (Jusczyk & Mandel-Emer, 1997). Other 
research indicates that children understand the individuating function of proper names as early as 
two years of age and are able to use proper names to track individuals, especially animates and 
their surrogates, across superficial changes (Gelman & Taylor, 1984; Katz, Baker, & 
Macnamara, 1974; Liitschwager & Markman, 1993; Sorrentino, 2001).  
Although young children may understand that proper names refer to unique individuals, the 
ability to track those individuals over time and over drastic change is a more complicated task. 
Individuals change over time. Toys and other artifacts break, are repainted, or parts might be 
replaced. People and animals grow and age and die. People change hairstyles and clothes. 
Despite these changes, we tend to consider that these individuals are still the same individuals. 
When do children understand that a name refers to an individual across these changes? Do 
children conceptualize some sort of immaterial identity in addition or beyond material identity, 
that holds together an individual across change? It has been suggested that something like an 
individual essence may be used as a conceptual tool to connect the varying instances of an 
individual, similar to the way in which essence connects members of natural kind categories 
(Gelman, 2003). It is possible that proper names could act as a conceptual vehicle for individual 
immaterial identity. 
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Research concerning children’s understanding of individual identity across drastic change 
suggests that young children do not locate identity in the mind or brain and thus are not able to 
track it across hypothetical brain transplants and magical transfer of mind (Corriveau, Pasquini, 
& Harris, 2005; Johnson, 1990).  In this research, identity is defined in mental terms, as feelings, 
thoughts, preferences, memories. Despite young children’s apparent inability to track this kind of 
identity over transplants and transformations, children’s books and fairytales provide many 
instances of magical transformations involving identity. Anecdotally, children appear to have 
some understanding of what is happening in these stories. It remains unclear whether young 
children, before achieving an understanding of mind as the location of identity, are able to use 
proper names to track immaterial individual identity across drastic changes in appearance, such 
as those described in fairytales and used in studies of identity understanding.  
In addition, research has not addressed children’s understanding of the value implications of 
naming. Although previous research on children’s understanding of authentic objects has 
indicated that children do recognize the value of objects such as Mr. Rogers’ sweater and a silver 
spoon owned by Queen Elizabeth in contrast to identical objects lacking such a history, this 
research has not examined the influence of proper names on judgments of value specifically 
defined in terms of irreplaceability (Hood & Bloom, 2008; Jacobs & Johnson, 2001). 
The purpose of the present research is to examine the development of the ability to utilize 
two functions of proper names: 1) to track individual identity and 2) to recognize the value 
implications of proper names. First, in terms of tracking, the studies address children’s ability to 
use proper names in contrast to other terms, such as category labels, mind and trait labels, to 
track identity across changes in position and magical transfers. It is possible that the ability to 
track immaterial individual identity, using proper names, develops prior to the understanding of 
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mind and thus, even young children should be able to use names to track identity across drastic 
transfers of identity. Second, the present research examines the possible way in which proper 
names might influence children’s thinking about the irreplaceable value of individuals, whether 
proper names contribute to moral intuitions such as a sense of an individual as irreplaceable. It is 
important to understand the development of these intuitions regarding the consequences of 
having a proper name since they might underlie notions of personhood that inform moral 
judgment and action. 
1.1 WHAT IS A PROPER NAME AND WHAT ARE ITS FUNCTIONS? 
Two important functions of proper names are that they refer to individuals, thus aiding in the 
tracking of individuals, and that they mark or confer value on an individual. In this way, they 
differ from other terms that may also refer to individuals, but do not mark or confer value, as 
well as from other terms that indicate value or an important relationship, but that do not highlight 
individuality. 
Proper names allow for the tracking of individuals and they are able to assist in this function 
because proper names differ from other lexical terms in that they refer to specific individuals, 
regardless of context. Proper names differ from common nouns in that rather than referring to a 
member of a kind, they refer to unique individuals. Even if a definite article picks out a specific 
individual in a particular context (e.g., “the dog”), that same combination of definite article and 
category label in another context can be used to pick out a different individual. Kripke (1980) 
argues that proper names are ‘rigid designators’ and are called such because they refer to an 
individual in all possible worlds. For example, the name Barack Obama refers to an individual 
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who was the infant son of a Kenyan father and anthropologist mother, a boy who attended an 
Indonesian school, and the president of the United States. But proper names are not just “pegs on 
which to hang descriptions” (Searle, 1959, p. 172). A proper name is a rigid designator because it 
also refers to Barack Obama in possible or counterfactual worlds. If Obama had chosen not to 
run for president, had not spent time in Indonesia as a child, and had chosen instead to become a 
professional surfer in Hawaii, the name Barack Obama would still refer to the same individual 
even though aspects of the description of that individual have changed. As J. S. Mill states, 
proper names ‘attach to objects, not their attributes’ (Mill qtd. in Vom Bruck & Bodenhorn, 
2006, p. 5). People, animals, artifacts, and natural inanimate objects tend to undergo change with 
time. Names allow us to keep track of an individual person whose “biological and social 
properties [are] undergoing constant flux” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 300). Thus, proper names are 
essential to identifying an individual and tracking that individual across real and possible worlds. 
In sum, proper names are conventionally established rigid designators that refer to individuals 
across change and in possible worlds (such as counterfactual worlds and the world beyond 
death).   
Proper names also differ from definite descriptions within a context in that they mark or 
enhance significance (Jeshion, 2009). Jeshion argues that “We give proper names only to certain 
particulars because, given cognitive limitations, we introduce singular representation-types just 
for those particulars regarded as having intrinsic or relational value, beyond their value as an 
instance of a certain kind, and we do so because we wish to signal and underscore that 
individuality” (373). Although not discounting the view that proper names do play a practical 
role in helping a community of speakers refer to individuals, Jeshion (2009) points to the unique 
role of proper names in marking and enhancing the significance of the individual to which the 
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proper name refers. Jeshion (2009) proposes that the use of a proper name “underscores or 
enhances the name’s referent’s significance for those who think of that individual through that 
name” (p. 373). In addition, Jeshion argues that proper names serve as “bearers of significance.” 
Jeshion posits that it is significance that guides naming in that “An agent can name an individual 
only if she accords intrinsic or relational significance to that individual” (2009, p. 374). Names 
are given to valued individuals and, once a name has been given, that name serves as a marker of 
the significance of that individual. In part, individuals, valued as individuals, are valued because 
they are irreplaceable. In sum, although definite descriptions can help us keep track of 
individuals in certain contexts, proper names go beyond a mere tracking function by highlighting 
and enhancing the irreplaceable value of the named individual. This significance or value of the 
individual stems from that individual’s unique qualities, the things that set that individual apart 
from others, and thus make that individual irreplaceable. 
The two functions of proper names on which the present studies focus are the roles they play 
in bringing attention to the irreplaceable value of an individual (names serving as markers of 
significance) and in tracking an individual across changes in location. I begin by considering 
cultural examples of the consequences of naming practices on irreplaceable value and identity 
tracking. Next, I review the developmental literature examining children’s understanding of 
proper names. Third, I consider research on children’s tracking of individual identity. Fourth, I 
briefly look at developmental research on value. Finally, I describe two studies that address the 
role of proper names in children’s irreplaceable value judgments and tracking of individuals.   
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1.2 NAMING PRACTICES ACROSS CULTURES 
Numerous examples in the anthropological literature illustrate the significance of giving proper 
names to people. Although naming practices vary cross-culturally (Alford, 1988), personal or 
proper names are universal. However, this cultural variation has striking consequences for both 
the value and the tracking of individuals. Who gets a name and who doesn’t, when names are 
conferred, and how the names are used in the culture, all influence which individuals are deemed 
valuable to keep track of.  
Cultures employ names to keep track of individual people within the social group. The 
convention that is the act of naming plays an important role in the connection of a proper name 
to the individual that it designates. In Kripke’s (1980) causal theory of reference, he proposes the 
idea that proper names are “‘rigid designators’ that continue to act as referents as long as links 
remain through a community of speakers to that person in question’” (Vom Bruck & Bodenhorn, 
2006, p. 7). In Kripke’s view, there is a sort of baptismal event that introduces a proper name as 
referring to an individual and this connection between name and individual is maintained by 
subsequent use of that name by others to refer to that individual. The act of conferring a proper 
name is a speech act and as such, naming does something, creates something new (Austin, 1959; 
Bloch, 2006; Searle, 1995). Just as a marriage ritual creates a new entity, a couple, a naming 
ceremony creates a social individual (Searle, 1995; Bourdieu, 2000). The baptismal event brings 
attention to an individual as important, or potentially important socially, as an individual, rather 
than as just a role or category member. The conferral of a proper name helps constitute the social 
individual who is maintained by the use of that proper name (Bourdieu, 2000; Kripke, 1980). 
Even children appear to recognize the conventional aspect of proper names, especially if they 
have been present for the naming (Homer, Brockmeier, Kamawar, & Olson, 2001).  
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The timing of the conferral of a proper name varies culturally with consequences for when a 
child may be considered a person, a social being (Alford, 1988). In many cultures babies are 
named between birth and nine days after birth, although some cultures wait until a child is one or 
more years of age, and this delay may be related to high infant mortality or beliefs that 
supernatural agents seek to harm infants (Alford, 1988). In locations in which infant mortality is 
high and an infant’s survival is uncertain, parents may confer “bad names”, as Bloch (2006) calls 
them, on infants, or give girl names to boys (Watson, 1986) to make infants less attractive to evil 
spirits or ghosts. Many cultures have naming ceremonies, such as baptism, and in some cases 
these ceremonies signal entry into society, that is, conferring of social membership, or simply 
emphasize the importance of the individual (Alford, 1988). However, a proper name differs from 
a social category label that also implicates a person in the social system, in that a proper name 
highlights individuality beyond occupying a social role. For example, among the Zafimaniry of 
Madagascar, the conferral of personal names seven to eight days after birth, does not serve to 
“evoke a ‘social’ system, but rather the ‘individual’ in themselves: an equally immaterial entity 
whose phenomenological existence is created by acts such as using personal names” (Bloch, 
2006, p. 101). 
Other naming practices, such as the use of category labels and teknonyms (i.e., parents are 
referred to by the names of their children, such as, mother of so-and-so) may also have an effect 
on identity and personhood. Watson’s (1986) ethnographic research in the village of Ha Tsuen 
near Hong Kong demonstrates that whereas men accumulate names during important social 
transitions that serve to further individuate them, women, who do receive them at birth, lose 
them at marriage and are essentially nameless as they are referred to by others by labels such as 
teknonyms or more generic labels like ‘old woman.’ Watson (1986) argues that these naming 
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practices serve to deny women full personhood. At death, the personal identity of a woman is 
obscured in the marking of her grave by the names of her father or husband. Similarly, Geertz 
and Geertz (1964) claim that the use of teknonyms in Bali create “genealogical amnesia,” 
resulting in a kinship system in which membership is flexible.  
When a name is not known or used, depersonalization and devaluation can result. For 
example, shortly after the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, Scheper-Hughes (1996) 
noted a contrast between the mode of reporting the deaths of blacks and whites that betrayed a 
difference in value toward the two groups. Whereas the deaths of blacks were listed in terms of 
body counts, those of whites were accompanied by names and other personal information. This 
contrasting use of names demonstrates the differentiation in value of the individuals whose 
deaths were reported.  
The presence or absence of personal names at the beginning and end of life also varies cross-
culturally and influences how people track and value the not-yet-born, the just born, and the 
recently dead.  In her research with pregnancy loss support groups, Layne (2006) proposes that 
the naming of fetuses and even blighted ova, serves to confer personhood, that makes their loss 
all the more significant. Thus, women and men gather to validate the personhood of those lost to 
miscarriage through support groups and memorial services. While providing a fetus with a 
proper name may confer it with personhood, the opposite also holds true. In one example 
described by Layne (2006), a couple pregnant with triplets chose to selectively terminate one of 
the fetuses to give the other two a better chance. They chose to name the two, but not the fetus 
selected for termination, even though none of them survived. In choosing not to name the one, 
the parents chose not to grant personhood to that fetus as was given to the others, perhaps 
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making termination easier emotionally and morally. Likewise, there is some evidence that 
infanticide is more common among infants that have not been given names (Balikci, 1970). 
The end of life is another transition during which naming practices become salient and 
important in terms of tracking immaterial identity. There is cultural variation in whether or not 
the dead keep their names. In some cultures there are taboos that guard against the naming of the 
dead (Iteanu, 2006). For example, among the Orokaiva in Melanesia, names are thought to 
belong to the living (Iteanu, 2006). At death, an individual loses his or her name and is referred 
to as ahihi (a plant emblem is used to refer to the dead in this category). Later on the dead 
disappear into “the depersonalized mass of the dead (onderi) which lies beyond the reach of the 
living” (Iteanu, 2006, p. 65). According to Iteanu (2006), for the Orokaiva, “Names do not 
belong to the person, are not contiguous to his or her body, do not carry individual memories, 
and do not need to be mourned” (p. 66). Such practices lead to a deindividualization of the dead. 
They lose their personal identities.  
In contrast to the Orokaiva, in other cultures such as in the United States, the names of the 
dead are made immortal through memorials (Layne, 2006), such as the Vietnam War Memorial 
in Washington, DC that lists the names of fallen soldiers. In addition, in the aftermath of 
September 11, 2001, and the Asian tsunami of 2004, identifying and listing the names of the 
dead has become an important practice. The inscription of names on tombstones or ancestral 
tablets also serves to keep the names of the dead alive in memory (Kiong, 1993). Among the Efe 
in Africa, summoning the dead involves calling out their names and it is believe that they will 
only respond to their names (Sawada, 1998). When used to refer to a deceased individual, proper 
names can serve as a vehicle for continued identity. 
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Proper names also contribute to the instantiation and tracking of supernatural beings, such as 
spirits. According to Lambek (2006), “Names help to realize spirits: noumenal beings are 
brought to sustained human attention and become relatively fixed in their natures, such that we 
may speak of an identity relation, in large part through the process of naming” (p. 118).  Thus 
naming plays an important role in the identity of a spirit that may or may not have a body, by 
providing them with a linguistic form. Lambek posits that “in referring to and addressing persons 
and spirits, names provide them with a vehicle for identity, that is, that identity is implicit in 
reference and address” (2006, p.118).  Spirits, lacking bodies, cannot be tracked perceptually and 
thus having a name provides them with both identity and a means by which they may be tracked. 
Thus, these examples from the anthropological literature suggest that although there are 
cultural variations in naming practices, these practices likely recruit cognitive universals, but in 
different ways to create this variation. Proper names elicit certain types of thinking about a 
named entity that are not elicited if an entity does not have a proper name. Providing a name 
helps constitute personhood, in part by drawing attention to an entity as important, or at least as 
having potential value. By denying a name, attention to an entity is also denied and that 
individual fades from memory. The use of the name of a dead individual keeps the memory of 
that individual alive, perhaps contributing to afterlife beliefs and the tracking of the identity of 
that individual even after the person is no longer present in bodily form. In addition, these 
different naming practices suggest that use of a proper name highlights the irreplaceable value of 
the individual and his or her individual subjective agency (a mind or soul rather than simply 
body). In sum, these examples point to three conclusions: 1) cultures recruit proper names to 
assist in the tracking of individuals within the community, 2) proper names can serve as vehicles 
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for the immaterial identity of disembodied agents such as gods and ancestors, and 3) proper 
names can function confer or mark the irreplaceable value of a member of society. 
1.3   CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING OF PROPER NAMES 
Early in development, children understand that proper names refer to individuals. The majority 
of the research examining children’s understanding of proper names has focused on children 
raised in English-speaking language environments. In English, proper names are syntactically 
distinct from count nouns. Proper names also differ from pronouns and other deictic words such 
as the demonstratives ‘this’ and ‘that’ whose meaning is context-bound (Bloom, 1990). Children 
acquire an understanding of proper names early in development (Bloom, 1990; Garcia-Ramirez 
& Shatz, 2011). Infants as young as 4.5 months distinguish between their names and other words 
(Jusczyk & Mandel-Emer, 1997).  By two years of age, children recognize proper names as 
specifying individuals and are able to use syntactic information to identify terms as proper 
names, if such cues are available in their language (Katz, Baker, & Macnamara, 1974; Gelman & 
Taylor, 1984; Hall, 1999; Hall, Lee & Belanger, 2001; Jaswal & Markman, 2001). Children are 
able to use other word-learning assumptions, such as mutual exclusivity and familiarity, when 
such syntactic information does not distinguish between proper and common nouns, as in 
Japanese (Imai & Haryu, 2001). 
By four years of age, children demonstrate a bias that proper names refer only to unique 
individuals, and will resist giving the same proper name to more than one entity (Hall, 1996; Hall 
& Belanger, 2005; Hall & Graham, 1999), unless the name is explicitly stated as a name 
belonging to both entities (Hall, 1996). Thus, despite the common experience of encountering 
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people who share the same proper name and of people who have more than one proper name 
(e.g., Barack Obama was referred to as Barry by friends at school and is now called President 
Obama), preschoolers tend to assume that there is only one proper name per entity and only one 
entity per proper name (Hall, 1998). However, with explicit instruction, children are able to 
override this default assumption (Hall, 1996). 
1.3.1 What gets a proper name? 
In the research on children’s understanding of proper names, the type of object that receives a 
novel label makes a difference in whether children interpret it as a proper name or as a count 
noun. Children as young as two years of age seem to recognize that things like dolls and stuffed 
animals have names, but things like blocks do not (Katz et al., 1974; Gelman & Taylor, 1984). In 
many of these paradigms, children are presented with objects that vary in terms of features of 
animacy. For example, children are shown either an animate surrogate or an inanimate entity that 
is labeled with a novel word modeled syntactically as either a proper name or a common noun 
(e.g., “zav” or “a zav”). Using such a paradigm, Katz et al. (1974) found that children only 
interpreted the novel label as a proper noun when it was presented syntactically as a proper noun 
for an animate-like entity. 
Building on this research, Gelman and Taylor (1984) also looked at the performance of 2-
year-olds in a similar study that used unfamiliar items and also distracter items to eliminate the 
possibility of an effect of familiarity. Children were presented with either an unfamiliar stuffed 
animal-like toy or a crazy comet block-like toy that was labeled with a nonsense word framed 
either as a proper name or a common noun. Children were then asked to pick out “zav” or “a 
zav” from a line-up of items including the named object, another category member, and an 
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outside category member. The results replicated the Katz et al. (1974) finding that children as 
young as two years of age interpret a label presented syntactically as a proper name when used to 
refer to an animal-like toy, but not a block-like toy. Jaswal and Markman (2001) also found that 
when two- and three- year –old children are presented with animate and inanimate pairs and 
asked to choose Dax, a dax, or one, they chose the animate item when asked to choose the word 
framed as a proper name, and will only use the named item to perform various actions on the 
entity that bears the proper name. This finding held up in both inferential and ostensive learning 
contexts.  
Although children will make distinctions in nameability between inanimate and animate 
entities, they do not consider all animals to be worthy of a proper name. Hall (1994) found that 
not all 3-and 4-year-old children were willing to give a name to a non-pet animal such as a 
caterpillar. However, an emphasis on the relationship of the animal to the experimenter made a 
difference, with children more likely to confer a proper name on a non-pet animal if that animal 
was presented as being owned by the experimenter. The emphasis on the relationship of the 
target entity to the experimenter did not hold across category boundaries, as the same effect was 
not found for complex artifacts that were presented as owned by the experimenter.  
In addition, children do not simply rely on a categorical distinction between animates and 
inanimates, but consider independent features of animacy in their judgments of nameability. 
Jipson and Gelman (2007) asked children various questions (e.g., biological, psychological, 
perceptual, artifact) about entities including a robot and faceless animals (e.g., starfish) that 
varied in terms of features such as being alive and having a face. In addition, they asked if each 
thing was nameable. They found that by four years of age children were able to discriminate 
between inanimate and animate things in answering whether or not they were nameable, however 
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they also responded that inanimates such as robots could also have names (as did older children 
and adults). Jipson and Gelman (2007) explain this finding by pointing out that the robot had a 
face, and this feature may have contributed to the response that it was nameable. 
Although in general the research suggests that children deem animates and their surrogates, 
but not inanimate objects, as namable, Sorrentino (1997) found that girls as young as two years 
of age will interpret a novel label as a proper name for an inanimate object if that object has been 
attributed mental states. In this study, children were introduced to two alien-looking animals and 
two foam shapes.  All were first labeled with a novel count noun and then all were removed 
except the target that was labeled with a novel proper name. In the mental state condition, the 
target objects were presented as having mental states, and in the neutral condition, they were 
merely described in terms of obvious features. The other objects were brought out and children 
were then requested to perform 10 actions, six with the named object, and four with the distracter 
objects. Children interpreted the novel label as a proper name for both the animate-like objects 
and the inanimate objects presented as having mental states. 
When explicitly asked what kinds of things can have a name, both children and adults, 
recognize that only certain kinds of things get proper names. Children use semantics to interpret 
novel words as proper names by two to three years of age, applying them to animals and dolls 
more often than to artifacts (Baker et al, 1974; Gelman & Taylor, 1984; Hall, 1994). When asked 
to list what can have a name, both children and adults list people and animals most often (Hall et 
al., 2004). Hall et al. (2004) show that five-year-olds stick to people, animals, and dolls when 
listing namable things, whereas adults have a more inclusive category of namable things 
including a variety of artifacts as well as things like institutions and sports teams. Hall et al. 
(2004) explain this age difference by arguing that children have limited exposure to the naming 
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of various entities and their early experiences with naming tend to deal with people, animals, and 
dolls. Additionally, Hall et al. (2004) contend that young children do not yet know about many 
of the things that adults name, such as monuments, institutions, and events. In contrast to this 
observed developmental difference in what is thought to receive a name, Hall et al. (2004) found 
no difference between children and adults in terms of the justifications for what makes an entity 
nameable. Both adults and children mention individuation and social interaction/affection as the 
primary reasons for naming. Therefore, Hall et al. (2004) explain that experience, rather than 
different conceptions of proper names, accounts for the difference between children and adults in 
their lists of nameable things. In sum, the results of these studies suggest that children initially 
consider animates with mental states as worthy of proper names, and by adulthood, expanding 
the category of proper namable things to include other entities that are considered important to 
individuate. 
1.3.2 Tracking paradigms in proper name research 
Children have been shown to be able to use proper names to track entities across space and 
superficial changes in appearance. A number of studies have used tracking paradigms to examine 
children’s understanding of proper names. In these paradigms, an individual entity receives a 
proper name, often a nonsense word in the syntactic form of a proper name, and this individual 
undergoes some sort of change, such as change of location or appearance (superficial or 
permanent). This changed individual is then paired with another unnamed individual that 
matches it in some way (is identical or shares some relevant property) and children are asked to 
pick out the individual bearing the name. If children interpret a proper name as referring to a 
unique individual across changes in location or appearance, they should select the original 
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individual. However, if they interpret it as a common noun or referring to a particular property, 
they should choose at chance. These studies find that by two years of age, children are able to 
track identity using proper names when a named individual is moved from one location to 
another and then paired with an identical object (Hall, Lee, & Belanger, 2001). Three-year-old 
children are able to track an individual marked in some way that is moved from one location to 
another, had its marker removed and paired with an identical object in the original location 
(Liittschwager & Markman, 1993). Sorrentino (2001) replicated these findings using a similar 
paradigm with one change: the final identical object was outfitted with the original marker to 
disentangle the name and that property. 
There is some evidence that children are able to use proper names to track individuals even 
when the appearance changes. Three-year-old children are able to track the identity of a named 
individual that has undergone changes of location and superficial appearance when contrasted 
with another individual perceptually identical to the original appearance of the named individual 
and in its original location (Liittschwager & Markman, 1993; Sorrentino, 2001). Hall, Waxman, 
Bredart and Nicolay (2003) found that by four years of age, children are able to pair a descriptive 
proper name (e.g., “Mr. Red”) with a property (e.g., green appearance) that contrasts with the 
meaning of the name. In this research, children were presented with narratives in which a 
character like Mr. Red who initially has a red appearance, undergoes either a superficial or a 
permanent change in color. Four-year-old children were able to override the contrast between 
name meaning and appearance, to track individual identity. This finding suggests that proper 
names function differently from perceptual properties in designating individuals, and that by four 
years of age, children are able to use form class cues to interpret a descriptive name as a proper 
name even if it does not accurately describe the target individual. In addition, Hall et al. (2003) 
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found that even three-year-old children were able to track a named individual over the 
transformation when the name was non-descriptive. 
1.4   TRACKING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY 
The proper name literature demonstrates that early on children are able to track individual 
identities as picked out by proper names. However, they limit their interpretation of novel proper 
names to animate sorts of things. In contrast to this evidence of an early understanding of 
identity via tracking, other literature suggests that children’s ability to track identity, as 
conceptualized as mind or brain or insides, is a later developmental achievement.  
The tracking of identity might not be a single process that encompasses both animate and 
inanimate entities. Individual identity might not be construed in the same way for both objects 
and people. In part, identity for both objects and agents derives from perceptible characteristics 
and spatiotemporal continuity. However, we are not able to keep track of such continuity all the 
time and characteristics can change. Bullot and Rysview (2007) argue for a distinction between 
object and agent tracking. They argue that rather than agents simply reducing to objects (bodies), 
tracking of agents is best captured by what they call an organism-dependent approach. According 
to this view, agents’ bodies, as organisms are understood as objects, however, agent-specific 
features must also be taken into account when tracking intentional agents. In addition, this 
organism-dependent approach calls for a distinction between two types of tracking, perceptual/ 
motor tracking and epistemic tracking (Bullot & Rysview, 2007). Perceptual and motor tracking 
is used for both objects and agents as the cognitive system tracks the spatiotemporal trajectory of 
individuals. According to Bullot and Rysview (2007), epistemic tracking “refers to cases in 
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which the target individual cannot be perceived but can be located or identified on the basis of 
correct information gathered by such sources as reasoning or communication” (p. 277). 
Epistemic tracking is reliant on language and thus proper names become especially important in 
this type of tracking. Since proper names refer to individuals across situations and in all possible 
worlds, they might be attaching to something that is as intangible as mind or soul or essence or 
history. For example, proper names help people identify and track current and former friends on 
social networking sites like facebook.  
1.4.1    Tracking the identity of objects 
Similar processes likely underlie tracking for both objects and agents, at least when it comes to 
the object properties that bodies possess. How might tracking differ for bodies and minds? 
Perceptual tracking of bodies involves several features such as perceptual similarity and 
spatiotemporal continuity, as well as information concerning category membership and causality. 
In terms of similarity, research paints a mixed picture of children’s use of this feature to 
identify individuals. Preschool aged children appear to understand biological change (Rosengren, 
Gelman, Kalish, & McCormick, 1991). However, other research suggests that young children are 
influenced by the appearance of objects in their judgments of what things are (Chandler, Boyes, 
Ball, & Hala, 1987; Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1986; Keil, 1989; Liittschwager, 1995). In 
research examining children’s understanding of kind identity, it has been demonstrated that 
children as young as five years are able to override perceptual information when making 
judgments concerning whether kind identity is maintained over superficial transformations (Keil, 
1989). However, when the transformations involve insides rather than surface changes, children 
are less likely to respond that kind identity is maintained. Change in appearance does seem to 
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influence children’s judgments of individual identity (Chandler et al., 1987; Gutheil & 
Rosengren, 1996; Keil, 1989) although changing a proper name does not (however other 
research suggests that changing a name does have consequences for preschoolers’ understanding 
of gender constancy, see Beal & Lockhart, 1989). Given young children’s seeming reliance on 
appearances, it is not surprising that Liittschwager (1995) found that four-year-olds are less 
willing than adults to allow identity to continue even across relatively minor changes in 
appearance. Adults and children demonstrate a gradual decrease in their judgments of identity 
continuity as changes become more drastic with the post-transformation individual becoming 
increasingly dissimilar perceptually to the pre-transformation individual (Liittschwager, 1995; 
Rhemtulla, 2005). It is unclear what children understand concerning the role of a proper name in 
establishing identity, that is, whether simply having a name versus not having a name influences 
identity tracking. 
Another influential factor in determining individual identity of objects is spatiotemporal 
information, that is, the trajectory in terms of space and time, of an individual. People tend to 
occupy one place at a time and follow continual paths rather than disappear and reappear.  This 
spatiotemporal continuity could serve as a useful cue in tracking the identity of an individual. 
More specifically, in studies involving transformation, how the transformation is depicted 
spatially may affect responses. Gutheil, Gelman, Klein, Michos, and Kelaita (2008) specifically 
set out to examine four- and five-year old children’s use of spatiotemporal cues in contrast to 
proper name and appearance, in tracking individual identity. They found that even when two 
individual stuffed toys were identical in proper name and physical appearance, children 
nevertheless distinguished them in terms of spatiotemporal location and the subsequent 
difference of mental states. 
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Causal information may also aid in the tracking of objects. Drawing on Nozick, Rips et al. 
(2006) propose a causal continuer approach, arguing that people take into account causal 
information in tracking individuals across transformations. That is, a particular individual at one 
moment in time is causally connected to the individual at a prior moment in time, regardless of 
difference in appearance. Rips et al. (2006) emphasize the role of causality in generating and 
maintaining individual identity. In their view, [c]ausality is important in this context because the 
theory’s chief idea is that the continuer of the original object must be a causal outgrowth of that 
original” (Rips et al., 2006, p. 7). They acknowledge that their approach is similar to that of 
psychological essentialism (Gelman, 2003), however, rather than pointing to specific causal 
mechanisms, their theory “takes no stand on the existence of a unique, distinctive cause that 
would answer to the notion of an essence” (Rips et al., 2006, p. 8). 
Some theorists have claimed that in order to understand individuals, we first must be able to 
conceptualize sortals. According to Blok et al. (2005), a sortal is “a count noun, like table, that is 
capable of singling out individual tables in a way that allows us to enumerate them” (p. 5). In 
contrast with an exemplar theory of categorization (Medin, 1989; Blok et al., 2005) in which an 
understanding of a category is abstracted from experience with individual members, a number of 
theorists argue that sortals underlie categorization (Hall, 1996; Macnamara, 1982; Reyes, 1994; 
Xu & Carey, 1996). That is, category understanding is conceptually prior to an understanding of 
individual identity. In this view, individuals belong to kinds and this background of kind 
membership aids in tracking individuals. Since kind membership is constant across situations 
(except in the case of counterintuitive transformations), and proper names pick out individuals 
from kinds, proper names rely on this modal constancy as the backdrop to identification. The 
argument is that “a proper name needs the support of such a kind in order to specify the 
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individual and in order to account for the tracing of that individual’s identity across situations” 
(Hall, 1999, p. 341). Evidence for the sortal view of individual identity, indicates that infants first 
use the object sortal as the basis for individuation and by 12 months, basic-level sortals become 
privileged (Xu, 2007; Xu & Carey 1996; but see Bonatti, Frot, Zangl, & Mehler, 2002, for the 
evidence supporting a human first hypothesis). 
However, research with preschool-aged children and adults involving cross-category 
transformations provides counter evidence to the sortal view. Liittschwager (1995) found that 
preschoolers and adults, when presented with transformations that ranged from no change to 
basic level change to ontological change, demonstrated a gradual decrease in judgments of 
continued identity, rather than a sudden drop off at the basic level. She argued that these results 
do not support Macnamara’s claim that sortals underlie individual identity. Similarly, Blok, 
Newman, and Rips (2005) found that adults, in a brain transplant paradigm, dissociate individual 
identity from category membership.  
This evidence does not mean that sortals are completely irrelevant to identity. Rhemtulla and 
Hall (2009) also have shown that adults will maintain that individual identity can withstand 
transformation across basic-level category boundaries. However, in these studies, adult 
participants demonstrated a u-shaped curve in identity continuity judgments, with 
transformations within the basic-level eliciting fewer continuity judgments than those that cross 
the basic-level category boundaries, and then dropping off again for transformations that crossed 
ontological boundaries. In addition, they argued that this finding does not support causal 
continuity theory that predicts that a causal process results in product that is closely related to its 
predecessor. Rhemtulla and Hall (2009) found that participants’ individual persistence ratings for 
the most closely related post-transformation individuals (within-basic category members) were 
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lower than those for less closely related ones.  Furthermore, they found that properties and 
proper names do not function in the same way. Whereas proper names refer to the entire 
individual, properties only refer to an aspect of the individual. In accord with this distinction, 
they found that participants were more likely to allow for the continuity of proper name than of 
property across transformations. 
1.4.2    Tracking the subjective identity of agents 
Thus, research suggests that to some extent, perceptual factors as well as causal and category 
information, aid in tracking individual bodily identity. However, agents also possess properties 
that distinguish them from inanimate objects and that make tracking more of a challenge (Bullot 
& Rysview, 2007). Agents in general have properties, such as autonomous movement, that make 
them more unpredictable than inanimate objects. Even babies differentiate inanimate objects and 
agents in terms of trajectory (Kuhlmeier, Bloom, & Wynn, 2004). Research indicates that the 
ability to distinguish between animate and inanimate entities emerges in infancy and continues to 
develop into the preschool years (Johnson, 2000; Wellman & Gelman, 1998). Research using 
imitation and attentional (e.g., habituation/violation of expectancy) paradigms has found that the 
following characteristics contribute to attributions of agency: having a face and eyes, asymmetry 
along one axis, non-rigid transformation, self-propulsion, and contingent behavior (Johnson, 
2000). How do these features figure into children’s understanding of proper names? Research by 
Jipson and Gelman (2007) suggests that by age four, children draw on features of animacy in 
judgments of whether entities can have a proper name. In addition, other research suggests that 
when an inanimate object is presented as having mental states, children will interpret a novel 
label as a proper name (Sorrentino, 1997). 
 25 
The idea that individual identity follows the mind or brain or soul rather than the body across 
transformations and transplants, rests on the notion of intuitive dualism, that the mind and body 
are separate and separable entities.  Bloom (2004) and Bering (2005) claim that children are 
intuitive dualists. The evidence to support this claim is derived from research on the afterlife 
beliefs of children and adults as well as research with infants gauging object and social 
knowledge. On this account, mind is equivalent to soul (Astuti & Harris, 2007; Bering & 
Bjorkland, 2004; Bering, Blasi, & Bjorkland, 2005; Cohen & Barrett, 2008; Harris & Gimenez, 
2005). In particular, the notion of dualism may underlie the belief in the persistence of individual 
identity after death (Bering & Bjorkland, 2004). That is, construing individual identity as located 
in the mind allows for the tracking of identity after death. In contrast, Richert and Harris (2006; 
2008) suggest that children are not intuitive dualists and demonstrate that both children and 
adults recognize that the mind and soul are unique entities with different functions. However, 
others propose that in addition to an essentialist approach to identity, narrative is also available 
as a conceptual frame to account for self-continuity (Chandler, Boyes, Ball, & Hala, 1987; 
Chandler, Lalonde, Sokol, & Hallett, 2003). 
In the identity research, particular emphasis has been placed on the identity of mentalistic 
agents, in accordance with implicit dualism. There is the possibility that tracking individual 
identity differs from the tracking of mere objects when it comes to those individuals that are 
believed to possess mentalistic agency. For those individuals that have minds, individual identity 
might be construed as located in the mind. Some research on children’s understanding of 
individual identity has taken the approach of Locke (Gutheil et al., 2008) and conceptualized 
identity as an individual’s memories, personal preferences, and contents of the mind (Corriveau, 
Pasquini, & Harris, 2005; Gutheil & Rosengren, 1996; Johnson, 1990). Proper names identify 
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individuals, individual identities. At some level, young children understand this role of proper 
names. However, children’s understanding of individual personal identity is still developing. 
Children’s conception of identity, it has been argued, develops from a more concrete, behavioral 
conception to one that is more abstract and mentalistic (Aboud & Ruble, 1987). 
A number of studies investigating children’s understanding of the mental or subjective aspect 
of individual identity rely on proper names as an indicator of identity.  In these studies, using 
cross-category transformation and transplant paradigms to determine where children locate 
identity, the proper name of the individual is one measure of identity. Johnson (1990) presented 
children aged five to eleven years with hypothetical brain transplant scenarios between a child 
(the participant) and a pig, a child and a baby, and a child and another child. Each of the 
individuals involved in these transplant scenarios had a proper name. The results indicate that by 
seven years of age, children have a conception of identity as residing in the brain. Building on 
Johnson (1990), Gottfried, Gelman, and Schultz (1999) presented preschoolers, school-age 
children, and adults with brain, stomach, and insides transplant scenarios involving familiar 
animals. The transplants involved cross-category transplants and the animals involved were not 
identified by proper names. Overall, the results suggest that children do not reach adult levels of 
response until around third grade (i.e., 8 years of age). This research indicated that children 
initially characterize the brain as a battery of sorts that involves general competencies.  
Building on this research, Corriveau et al. (2005) examined whether younger children are 
able to track identity across transformation if the transformation involves the mind versus the 
brain. They argued that the hypothetical brain transplant might be more difficult for young 
children to understand. Thus, in their study, they presented five-year-olds, seven-year-olds, and 
adults with a cross-category magical transformation (e.g., from a named boy to an unnamed 
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horse) framed as either involving the mind or the brain. Participants were asked questions about 
the identity and category membership of the post-transformation individual. Overall, the 
performance of five-year olds was at chance for the brain story, but above chance for the mind 
story, whereas the seven-year-olds performed above chance for both types of story. The seven 
year-olds were above chance for all questions in the mind story, and performed similarly for the 
brain story with the exception of the name question. Although adults linked proper name, 
identity, and brain, the five- and seven-year-olds did not. The five-year olds did not link proper 
name, mind, and identity, but both the seven-year-olds and the adults did. For the name question 
(e.g., “If you asked him who he was, what would he say ‘I’m Chris!’ or ‘I’m a horse’?”), neither 
brain nor mind was significant for five-year-olds; mind but not brain was significant for seven-
year-olds; and both brain and mind were significant for adults. However, the forced-choice name 
question pitted a proper name against a category label. The problem with that question is that the 
post-transformation individual really could be construed as both because the body would accord 
with the category label and the mind or brain with the proper name. These studies indicate that 
the mind and brain come to be understood as the location of identity. However, it is unclear what 
the role of proper name is in these instances. Does it refer to the brain or mind only if that is 
where identity is located? The question is problematic because it does not get at whether children 
are tracking identity along with mind or brain. Rather, responses to that question reflect which 
type of identity is most salient to children and adults. Post-transformation Chris is both Chris and 
a horse. The results of the study indicate that 5-year-olds seem to understand mind as the 
location of identity, however they did not link this to proper name. Seven-year-olds are 
beginning to link identity, proper name and mind, but do not yet make these connections for 
brain. 
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In sum, while the proper name literature demonstrates that young children are able to track 
identity, other literature suggests that children’s ability to track identity, as conceptualized as 
mind or brain or insides, is a later developmental achievement. The question remains as to what 
kind of identity is being tracked with a proper name. To what does a proper name attach: a 
person’s body, brain, insides, mind, or soul? When confronted with a transformation of an agent, 
do children engage in both epistemic tracking and object tracking? Which type of identity, 
immaterial or physical, takes precedence? Are children able to use proper names to track 
individual identity across change even before they understand the mind or brain as the location 
of identity? Research indicates that children as young as two years of age understand the 
individuating function of proper names. In addition, there is also evidence that they make some 
connection between mental states and proper names, even though they have yet to achieve theory 
of mind or locate identity in the mind (Sorrentino, 1997). Therefore, children may be able to use 
proper names to track identity even in the face of drastic perceptual change and without a full-
fledged understanding of mind. 
1.4.3    Summary of identity research 
Most of the studies examining identity have used a person or a mentalistic agent as the starting 
point. However, in the individual persistence literature, individual identity is not explicitly 
construed as mind, and relies on the assumption that the proper name refers to the individual in 
question. In those studies the proper name is the measure of individual persistence across 
transformation. In the identity tracking literature, individual identity is explicitly construed in 
mentalistic terms, incorporating memories and personal preferences. In these studies, proper 
name is also used as a measure of continuity of identity across transformation.  
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The transformations and transfers involved in both identity persistence and mentalistic or 
subjective identity literatures encompass a number of variations. Transformations of individuals 
have involved various mechanisms including transplants (Johnson, 1990; Gottfried et al, 1999), 
machines (Rhemtulla & Hall, 2009), and magic (Corriveau et al, 2005; Liittschwager, 1995). In 
addition, the transformations themselves vary in terms of how many individuals are involved and 
in how the transformation is depicted. In some studies, a named target individual is transformed 
into something else and the participant is asked if the post-transformation individual is the named 
target (Corriveau et al, 2005; Liittschwager, 1995; Rhemtulla & Hall, 2009). In those studies that 
employed pictures, the picture of the post-transformation individual is placed on top of the 
picture of the pre-transformation individual (Liittschwager, 1995; Rhemtulla & Hall, 2009). In 
other studies, there is also a transformation, but it is specified that the mind or brain remains the 
same and that it is only the body that has changed (Corriveau et al, 2005). In the Johnson (1990) 
hypothetical brain transplant studies, two bodies were involved in the hypothetical situations.  
Previous studies also differ in terms of what category boundaries get crossed during the 
transformations or transfers, ranging from appearance and within-category changes to cross-
ontological boundary crossings. In research by Liittschwager (1995), transformations involved a 
change of state (e.g., from dry to wet), physical appearance, age, basic kind, and animacy. 
Rhemtulla and Hall’s (2009) research with adults involved transformations that either changed or 
maintained basic-level kind category. The results of these studies are mixed. On the whole, 
judgments of identity continuity decrease as the post-transformation individual become 
increasingly dissimilar to the target. However, Rhemtulla and Hall (2009) have found that 
within-category transformations, such as when a German Shepherd changes into a Golden 
Retriever, are judged to result in lower identity continuity then when a dog transformed into a 
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cat. Thus, it is still unclear whether maintenance of basic-level kind is necessary for identity as 
suggested by Macnamara (1982). 
Although children come to locate individual identity in the mind later in development, even 
young children do have some understanding of individual identity as evidenced in their 
understanding of proper names. It is likely that they are able to use proper names to engage in 
epistemic tracking. However, the parameters of this ability in young children are not clear. Are 
children able to use proper names to track individual identity across the type of drastic changes 
found in the identity literature? In addition, how is this tracking ability related to judgments of 
irreplaceable value? 
1.4.4    Irreplaceable Value 
An individual valued for his or individuality cannot be replaced. For example, there is only one 
authentic Elvis Presley. Elvis impersonators, no matter how good and indistinguishable from the 
original Elvis, are considered only impersonators and do not possess the same value as the 
original Elvis. The original Elvis cannot be replaced Human individuals possess unique 
combinations of biology and experience with varying histories, experiences, relationships, 
thoughts, knowledge, and physical characteristics. The function of proper names to mark or 
confer value on individuals has not been explicitly examined in the psychological literature, but 
there is some evidence that named entities are also perceived as more valuable and less 
replaceable than other things. Hall et al. (2004) report that children and adults mention 
importance and relationship in their justifications of why certain things can have names, and they 
more often give proper names to people and other animates than other types of entities. And, 
other research demonstrates that adults judge characters possessing a greater degree of agency as 
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more valuable (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007).  Gray et al. (2007) found that “with the 
progressions from no mind…to adult human mind…characters become more highly valued. 
Thus, both dimensions correlated with a liking for a character, wanting to save it from 
destruction, wanting to make it happy, and perceiving it as having a soul” (p. 619). Things that 
are of high value have certain attributes and those things are the type of things that we give 
names. Thus there is likely an integral connection between things that are valued and things that 
are named.   
Although studies looking specifically at the connection between names and value have not 
been conducted, research does indicate that preschool aged children do have some understanding 
that authentic objects and objects that have a history of ownership are more valuable than 
identical objects without such a history (Frazier & Gelman, 2009; Frazier, Gelman, Wilson, & 
Hood, 2009; Hood & Bloom, 2008; Jacobs & Johnson, 2001). In a study of attachment objects, 
Hood and Bloom (2008) found that children preferred the original attachment object over an 
exact copy. In this study, 3- to 6-year-old children were shown a “copy machine” that could 
duplicate objects. The experimenter copied a toy that was the experimenter’s and then asked 
children which toy they would like to keep. Most children chose the copy. However, when the 
copied object was the child’s attachment toy, most children chose the original. In a second study 
in which either Queen Elizabeth’s spoon or an ordinary silver spoon was duplicated, 6-year-olds 
expressed that the original Queen Elizabeth’s spoon was more valuable than a duplicate, whereas 
a duplicate silver spoon was just as valuable as the original that lacked such a history. This 
research suggests that the history of an individual object adds to its value, an idea also supported 
by research by Jacobs and Johnson (2001) in which even preschoolers, when asked to choose 
only one of two items to put in a moving van, chose an object with a connection to known agents 
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over objects lacking such connections. In another study, Johnson and Jacobs (2001) 
demonstrated that children recognize Mr. Rogers’ sweater as more worthy to be in a museum 
than an identical, but new sweater never worn by Mr. Rogers. However, other research suggests 
that preschool aged children’s understanding of original objects is incomplete and thus may 
influence their understanding of the value of unique individuals (Evans, Mull, & Poling, 2002). 
In sum, developmental research suggests that things other than people that are recognized as 
important as individuals, due to characteristics such as ownership and history, also are judged as 
more valuable than identical things that lack such characteristics. However, research has not 
addressed the role of proper names in contributing to the perceived value of individuals, bringing 
attention to the potential value of the individual as an irreplaceable individual, as suggested by 
evidence in the anthropological literature. 
1.5    RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Proper names are the primary way in which we track certain animates and this type of epistemic 
tracking of individuals develops earlier and is more basic than tracking individual minds. That is, 
the initial concept of the individual identity of agents is premental and available to children 
before acquiring a full-fledged understanding of mind as the location of identity. This individual 
identity is not simply bodily or physical identity. Children begin using names to track identity 
and later elaborate where identity is located and of what it is comprised. Since children’s 
experience is limited early on, the understanding of proper names is restricted to people, dolls, 
and pets. It is these entities that are important in the life of a young child and with which the 
child is engaged in relationships. Proper names highlight the importance of these entities, 
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reflecting their irreplaceable value. Thus value defined as irreplaceability becomes linked to the 
possession of a proper name. With experience, the category of proper nameable things expands. 
This expansion occurs as children become acculturated and other types of things become 
important and valued as individuals, including things like books, artwork, and schools. The 
naming of these individuals highlights their value and importance, making them irreplaceable. 
The anthropological literature suggests that proper names highlight value and aid in tracking, 
however research has not examined the development of intuitions that follow from the conferral 
of a proper name, particularly as pertains to irreplaceable value. Previous research has 
demonstrated that young children are able to track individuals across some changes. However 
research has not addressed whether younger children, who do not locate identity in the mind or 
brain, nevertheless are able to track subjective, mentalistic identity, using proper names, across 
magical transfers as depicted in fairytales. The present studies build on previous research by 
examining children’s ability to use proper names, in contrast to mind and other labels, to track 
identity across changes in location and in magical transfers. In addition, the present research 
examines children’s understanding of the value implications of proper names.  
The goals of the present studies are: 
1) to determine if children are able to use proper names to track individual material identity 
across change in location and individual subjective identity across magical transfers 
2) to examine the development of the understanding of the irreplaceable value that comes 
along with having a proper name  
The purpose of the proposed research is to examine the development of the ability to use 
proper names to track individual identity as well as children’s understanding of the value 
implications of proper names. In addition, the proposed research examines the development of 
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children’s understanding of subjective identity and whether children are able to use proper names 
as a vehicle for that identity before they understand mind as the locus of identity. More 
specifically, the studies address children’s ability to use proper names in contrast to mind and 
other labels (trait labels, category labels, and possessive pronouns), to track identity across 
transfers (changes in location and magical transfers). Furthermore, the proposed research 
examines the possible consequences of proper names for children’s thinking about individuals: 
whether proper names contribute to moral intuitions such as a sense of an individual as 
irreplaceable.  
Study 1a examined children’s ability to use proper names to track identity as well as the 
influence of proper name versus other types of labels on judgments of the replaceability on 
different kinds of toys (stuffed toy, toy car) in four- and seven-year-old children and adults. 
Previous research has shown that by six years of age, children demonstrate an understanding of 
the value that stems from ownership or history, and even younger children have some 
appreciation of the value of an object that is connected to someone (Hood & Bloom, 2008; 
Jacobs & Johnson, 2001). However, whether children link the idea of irreplaceable value to 
entities that have proper names in contrast to those that do not is still an open question.  
Study 1b examined whether four- and seven-year-old children are able to track immaterial 
identity across a magical transfer earlier with proper names than with mind. Given the evidence 
that young children understand proper names and are able to use them to track named individuals 
across minor changes, it is possible that the ability to track identity develops prior to the 
understanding of mind and thus, even young children should be able to use proper names to track 
identity across drastic magical transfers. Therefore, the present study is designed to examine 
whether young children, before achieving a sense of mind as the locus of identity, are able to 
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track subjective identity across magical transfers. Study 1b also examined whether the 
ontological category (person or dog) influences children’s ability to track identity. Previous 
research has suggested that the type of boundary (within basic level category to different 
ontological category) crossed in the transfer influences judgments of continuity of identity. In 
accordance with the findings of Rhemtulla and Hall (2009) it is hypothesized that given the 
within-basic level category contrast effect, children will show greater reluctance to track identity 
across a within category (person to person) transfer. Furthermore, this study examines the affect 
of content and category on irreplaceable value judgments. 
Study 2 examined the ability of four- and seven-year-old children and adults to use proper 
names versus trait labels to track subjective identity across transfers differing in degree of 
ontological distance (person, dog, stone) from the target individual. In addition, this study 
examined the affect of label type and category on irreplaceable value judgments. 
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2.0  STUDY 1A: OLD TOY STUDY 
Study 1a examined children’s use of proper names to track identity as well as the influence of 
proper names on judgments of irreplaceable value. Previous research has demonstrated that 
children as young as four years of age, are able to use spatiotemporal information to track a 
named toy and differentiate it from toys identical in both appearance and label (Gutheil et al., 
2008). In addition, research has shown that children as young as two years of age are able to use 
proper names to keep track of individual toys that have changed position and even appearance 
(Hall et al., 2001; Sorrentino, 2001). Study 1a builds on previous research by similarly 
contrasting a named toy with an identical toy labeled with other types of labels. Similar to 
procedure used in other studies (Hall et al., 2001; Sorrentino, 2001), the procedure in Study 1a 
required children to use a proper name to track a toy across changes in position and in contrast to 
a toy identical in appearance but bearing either a category label only or a category label modified 
by a possessive pronoun to indicate ownership. In addition, in Study 1a, the influence of type of 
toy was examined, in that a stuffed animal (animate surrogate) was compared to a toy car 
(inanimate). Given the findings of previous research, children as young as four years of age 
should be able to use a proper name and spatiotemporal information to track an individual toy 
across changes in position and when presented with an identical toy that differs only in how it is 
labeled. In addition, in Study 1a, unlike in previous studies, the target toys were labeled with 
actual, but unusual, proper names (“Shelby” and “Lyle”) rather than novel labels, since previous 
 37 
research has already established that children use syntactic information to interpret novel labels 
as proper names (Hall, 1995).  
Unlike previous studies, Study 1a also examined whether or not children make a 
connection between having a proper name and being valued as an irreplaceable individual 
identity. An individual valued for his or individuality cannot be replaced. For example, there is 
only one authentic “Mona Lisa” painting. Copies of the painting, no matter how good and 
indistinguishable from the original, are considered forgeries and do not possess the same value as 
the original. The original ”Mona Lisa” cannot be replaced. Additionally, humans are individual 
with no one having the exact same combination of biological make-up and experience. What 
makes an individual unique may include such things as history, experience, relationships, 
thoughts, knowledge, physical characteristics.  Although studies looking specifically at the 
connection between names and value have not been conducted, research does indicate that 
preschool aged children do have some understanding that authentic objects and objects that have 
a history of ownership are more valuable than identical objects without such a history (Frazier & 
Gelman, 2009; Frazier, Gelman, Wilson, & Hood, 2009; Hood & Bloom, 2008; Jacobs & 
Johnson, 2001).  Jeshion (2009) argues from a philosophical standpoint that proper names mark 
an individual as valuable and that individuals valued as unique, irreplaceable individuals are the 
ones given proper names.  
For the purpose of Study 1a, value was defined as the judgment of an individual as 
irreplaceable. Children were asked to judge the replaceability of an old and worn toy bearing a 
proper name in contrast to an identical toy without a proper name. Children participated in one of 
two label conditions. In one condition, the second toy was referred to by a category label only. In 
a second condition, the second toy was referred to by a category label modified by a possessive 
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pronoun indicating ownership, to determine if a proper name alone marks irreplaceable value, or 
if ownership conveys irreplaceable value equivalent to having a proper name. This second 
condition was included to address the question of whether a proper name matters beyond mere 
relationship. Children might infer from an object’s having a proper name that the experimenter 
has a relationship or history with the object, or it is possible that a proper name suggests 
irreplaceable value that goes beyond ownership. Ownership does not necessarily imply that a toy 
is considered irreplaceable. It was hypothesized that toys with proper names would be judged as 
more irreplaceable than toys marked with category labels. However, if proper names mark an 
irreplaceable value to a greater degree than mere ownership, children would treat the toys labeled 
with proper names as more irreplaceable than those labeled with category labels modified by a 
personal pronoun to designate ownership. If proper names imply a relationship, then in the 
responses to the value questions, children should treat proper names as equivalent to possessive 
pronouns. The label condition was included to control for ownership as a possible explanation 
for irreplaceable value judgments. 
Two different types of toys were contrasted to determine if named animate surrogates are 
judged as both more likely to bear a proper name and inherently more valued as irreplaceable 
than other named inanimate objects. Previous research suggests that children are less willing to 
accept novel labels with syntactical cues suggesting a proper name, as proper names for entities 
such as inanimates and even animates such as worms (Gelman & Taylor, 1984; Hall, 1994), 
unless children are explicitly told that the entities possess mental states (Sorrentino, 1997). In 
those studies, children treated novel labels applied to such entities as category labels rather than 
proper names. In Study 1a, children were presented with toy cars and stuffed toy elephants 
bearing actual proper names (rather than novel labels modeled as proper names). Would children 
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accept the proper name for the toy car? In order to examine this question, children ages 4 and 7 
years were tested. Previous research has indicated that by 4 years of age children are able to track 
individual identity in many situations, however this ability is still developing. Based on the 
findings of previous research, it was hypothesized that the youngest children would be able to 
keep track of the object labeled with a proper name. However, if younger children interpret the 
proper name as a category label for the car but not for the stuffed toy, they might not 
differentiate between the two toy cars, thus choosing them equally for both identity and 
irreplaceable value questions. It is possible that older children, who have more experience with 
proper names conferred on inanimate objects, might be more willing to accept a proper name for 
the toy car and demonstrate this with equivalent tracking of individual identity for both toy types. 
If children accept the proper name for the toy, they should be able to track that toy. It was 
hypothesized that the label type of the second toy presented would not have an effect on 
children’s ability to track the target toy. 
Does a proper name in and of itself mark irreplaceable value regardless of type of object 
as Jeshion (2009) argues? Research suggests that adults value agents more than entities with less 
or no agency (Gray, et al., 2007) and that both children and adults list as nameable, people, 
animals, and animate surrogates more often than inanimates (Hall et al., 2004).  Would children 
presented with an animate surrogate be less likely to judge the toy as replaceable than those 
presented with an inanimate toy car? If children accept a proper name for a toy car, would they 
also consider that individuated car as less replaceable than a generically identical car, despite 
both being inanimate objects? It is possible that value judgments are related to identity tracking 
ability, in that especially for younger children, the stuffed toy would be judged as irreplaceable 
more often than the toy car. However, if children do accept the proper name for the named object 
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and are able to track the individual successfully, it was hypothesized that regardless of age, 
children would judge objects labeled with a proper name as less replaceable than those labeled 
with a category label or possessive pronoun.  
2.1 METHOD 
2.1.1    Participants 
Participants included 64 four-year-olds (mean: 4.77, range: 3.97 - 5.88) and 64 seven-year-olds 
(mean: 7.31, range: 6.17 - 8.78). The participants were recruited from preschools and schools in 
Grand Rapids, MI, and preschools and afterschool programs in Pittsburgh, PA. Children were 
tested individually at their schools. The children participating in this study also participated in 
Study 1b. 
2.1.2    Materials 
Two stuffed animals and two toy cars were used. The pairs of toys were identical and were made 
to look old and worn in identical ways (e.g., both stuffed toys had the same eye missing, and 
both cars had identical scuff marks). The stuffed animal was a blue elephant with a red ribbon 
with white hearts tied around its neck. The toy car was green and of comparable size to the 
stuffed elephant. In addition, there was a small wastebasket in the room where the session took 
place.  
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2.1.3    Design 
The between-subjects factors were Toy Type (two levels), Label Contrast (two levels), and Age. 
The two levels of Toy Type were animate surrogate (stuffed animal) and inanimate object (a toy 
car). The two levels of Label Contrast were proper name versus category label and proper name 
versus possessive pronoun. The two levels of Age were younger (four-year-old) children and 
older (seven-year-old) children. 
2.1.4    Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. Half the children were presented with a pair of stuffed 
animals (elephants) and the other half with a pair of toy cars. In all conditions, the target toy was 
labeled with a proper name. Half the participants heard the second toy labeled with a category 
label (an elephant, a car) and the other half of the participants heard the second toy labeled with a 
category label modified by the possessive pronoun “my.” Thus, participants were assigned to one 
of four conditions: 1) elephant-category label, 2) elephant-possessive pronoun, 3) car-category 
label, 4) car-possessive pronoun. 
Introduction (naming) and play phase. The experimenter took the target toy out of a bag and 
introduced the child participant to the toy by labeling it with a proper name (e.g., “This is 
Shelby/Lyle”). Then the experimenter continued, “I like to play with Shelby/Lyle.” The 
experimenter then drew attention to an identifying feature of the toy. “Look, Shelby/Lyle has a 
ribbon with hearts/a door that can open. Isn’t that neat?”  
Value 1 phase. Then the experimenter pointed out the condition of the toy. “Oh no! Look, 
Shelby’s/Lyle is old and worn. I don’t think Shelby/Lyle will ever be new again.” The 
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experimenter then asked the child, “What should I do?” After recording their open-ended 
response, children were presented with two options. “Should I get a new one?” or “Should I keep 
this one?” The order of these option questions were counterbalanced across participants. Finally, 
after each response to each option question, children were asked a justification question. For 
example, “Why do you think we should get a new one/keep this one?” The target toy was then 
placed to the left of the child.  
Identity 1 phase. Then an identical toy was taken out of the bag. This toy was introduced 
with a category label for half of the participants and with a category label modified by a 
possessive pronoun for the other half of the participants. The experimenter then continued, “I 
like to play with [the elephant/the car/my elephant/my car].” “Look, [the elephant/the car/my 
elephant/my car] has a ribbon with hearts/a door that can open. Isn’t that neat?” Each toy was 
placed equidistant in front of the child participant, with the second toy to the right of the child 
and the named toy to the left of the child. The experimenter then asked the child to perform an 
action (e.g., “Can you touch Shelby’s ear/ open Lyle’s door?”) on the target toy, to determine if 
children could track the identity of the named toy.  
Value 2 phase. In the next phase of the experimental session, the experimenter picked up the 
toys, presented the two toys, side by side and asked, “If I have to throw one away, which one 
should I throw away?”  
Identity 2 phase. Then the experimenter responded (regardless of the child’s response) that 
the target toy should be thrown away (“This one is old and worn. I am going to throw it away”) 
and put the named toy in the wastebasket. The experimenter then asked, “Where is Shelby/Lyle 
now?” to get a final measure of children’s ability to track the identity of the named toy. 
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2.2 RESULTS 
2.2.1    Responses to Identity Questions 
The identity questions tested children’s ability to track a named toy across changes in location 
and in contrast to an identical toy. The two identity questions required children to select one of 
the two toys by pointing or touch. A correct response was a touch or point indicating the toy that 
was labeled with a proper name at the beginning of the experimental session. Responses to both 
identity questions were coded as follows. If a child chose the toy labeled with the proper name, 
the response was coded as ‘1’. All other responses were coded as ‘0,’ with the exception of 
“none” and “I don’t know” which were removed from the analyses. The responses to both 
identity questions were summed to create the variable of Identity, with a possible range of 0-2. A 
variable, index, was created that distinguished between responses to the first and second identity 
questions. In this index variable, responses to the first identity question were coded as ‘1’ and 
responses to the second identity question were coded as ‘2.’  
An initial Repeated Measures Logistic Regression was performed on Identity with Sex 
(male, female), age group (younger, older), toy (stuffed toy, toy car), label condition (category 
label, possessive pronoun), and index (question 1, question 2) as the predictor variables. Sex did 
not have any significant effect on identity tracking. 
To examine the hypotheses that younger children would have no problem tracking a toy 
labeled with a proper name, that their ability to track would depend on toy type, and that older 
children would demonstrate greater ability to track identity, a Repeated Measures Logistic 
Regression was performed on Identity with age group (younger, older), toy (stuffed toy, toy car), 
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label condition (category label, possessive pronoun), and Index (question 1, question 2) as the 
predictor variables. All assumptions were met. 
The three-way interactions were run individually. None of the interactions were 
significant. Subsequently, a Main Effects Only Model was run. Age group significantly predicted 
responses to the identity questions (χ2 (1) = 14.25, p < .001).  Younger children were less likely 
than older children to successfully track the identity of the toy. Overall, younger children 
correctly chose the named toy 66.14% of the time, compared to 91.33% for the older children. 
In addition, the specific question asked significantly predicted children’s responses (χ2 
(1) = 5.66, p = .017).  Children were better at identifying the named toy on the second identity 
question (M = .85, SE = .042) in which they were asked where the named toy was after it had 
been thrown away, than on the first question (M = .75, SE = .052). 
In comparing the responses of the combined age groups on the first identity question to 
chance, it was revealed that children’s responses differed significantly from chance, t (125) = 
6.07, p < .001. However, when looking at the age groups separately, only the responses of the 
older children differed significantly from chance, t (63) = 4.43, p < .001. Younger children 
responded at chance to the first identity question, t (61) = 1.47, p = .15. For the second identity 
question, the responses of the combined age groups (t (112) = .065, p = .95) and of the younger 
children did not differ significantly from chance, t (62) = 2.52, p = .015). However, the responses 
to the second identity question of the older children differed significantly from chance, t (62) = 
6.79, p < .001. 
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2.2.2    Responses to Irreplaceable Value Questions 
To examine whether having a proper name influenced children’s responses to the irreplaceable 
value questions, analyses were performed separately for the Open-ended Value Question, the 
Value One phase (questions 1 and 2), and the Value Two question. 
 
2.2.2.1    Open-ended Value Question 
 
Children were presented with an open-ended value question to elicit their spontaneous ideas for 
what might be done with an old and worn toy, prior to presenting them with questions 
specifically addressing replaceability. Responses to the open-ended value question (“What 
should I do [with the old and worn, named toy]?”) were categorized as follows. If a child 
responded that they toy was replaceable (e.g., “get a new one,” throw it away,” etc.), the 
response was scored as ‘0’. A response indicating that the toy was valued and should not just be 
replaced (e.g., “keep it,” “fix it”) received a score of ‘1’. Other responses such as “I don’t know”, 
no response, unclassifiable were coded as ‘2’. Responses to the open-ended value question were 
independently coded by the experimenter and a second coder who was unaware of the 
hypotheses of the study. Inter-rater reliability was 96.21% and disagreements were resolved 
through discussion. 
Responses to the Open-ended Value Question were analyzed using Multinomial Logistic 
Regression with age group (younger, older), toy (stuffed toy, toy car), and label condition 
(category label, possessive pronoun) as the predictor variables. All assumptions were met. Three 
different models were run: Main effects, Two-way Interactions, and Three-way interactions.  
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Responses to the open-ended value question were significantly predicted by age group 
(χ2 (2) = 8.74, p = .013, NagelkerkeR2= .12). The children in the younger age group were 4.23 
times more likely than older children to give responses coded as “other” than responses 
indicating that the toy should be replaced in response to the question, “What should I do [with 
the old and worn toy]?,” B = 1.44, χ2 (1) = 6.63, p = .010, exp(B) = 4.23. That is, when asked 
what children thought the experiment should do with the old toy, younger children more often 
proffered responses that fell into the category of “other” than responses indicating that they 
thought the toy should be replaced or kept (see Table 1). Although overall the number of keep 
responses was higher than the number of replace responses, a chi-square analysis considering 
only the replace and keep responses indicated that there were no significant differences by age, 
χ2 (1) = .107, p = .74. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Response frequencies for open-ended value questions by age group and category of 
response. 
 
 Replace Keep Other 
Younger 14 29 21 
Older 20 36 6 
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2.2.2.2    Value one questions 
 
The value one phase of questions examined children’s thoughts about the replaceability of the 
named toy, explicitly asking whether the experimenter should get a new one or keep the named 
toy. Responses to the first two value questions (“Should I buy a new one?” and “Should I keep 
this one?”) were coded as ‘0’ for ‘no’ and ‘1’ for ‘yes.’ All other responses (“I don’t know”, 
“none”, no response) were removed from the analysis. Responses to the two value questions 
(“Should I buy a new one?” and “Should I keep this one?”) were collapsed to create one 
variable: value one.  In addition, a variable, called Index was created to encompass both replace 
and keep. For the Index variable, responses to the replace question, “Should I buy a new one?,”  
was coded as ‘1’ and responses to the keep question, “Should I keep this one?,”  were coded as 
‘2.’ 
To examine the influence of toy type and age on responses to the value one question, two 
Repeated Measures Logistic Regressions were conducted. An initial Repeated Measures Logistic 
Regression was performed on value one with sex (male, female), age group (younger, older), toy, 
(stuffed toy, toy car) and label condition (category label, possessive pronoun) and Index (replace, 
keep) as predictors. There was no significant effect of sex. Subsequently, a Repeated Measures 
Logistic Regression was performed on value one with age group (younger, older), toy type 
(stuffed toy, toy car), label condition (category label, possessive pronoun), and index (replace, 
keep) as predictors. All assumptions were met.  
There was a significant age group X index interaction (χ2 (1) = 5.14, p = .023).  Younger 
children (M = .83, SE = .057) were more likely than older children (M = .67, SE = .12) to want to 
“replace” the toy. Pairwise comparisons indicated that the effect was driven by the older children 
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who responded that the toy should be kept (M = .86, SE = .46) more often than that the 
experimenter should get a new one (M = .69, SE = .064), and this difference was marginally 
significant, χ2 (1) = 3.70, p = .054. 
The toy type X index interaction was also significant (χ2 (1) = 5.57, p = .018).  Children 
were more likely to want to replace the toy car (M = .82, SE = .067) than the stuffed toy (M = 
.68, SE = .12). Pairwise comparisons revealed that children presented with the stuffed toy more 
often responded that the toy should be kept (M = .87, SE = .043) than that the experimenter 
should get a new stuffed toy (M = .70, SE  = .060) and this difference was significant, χ2 (1) = 
4.69, p = .030. 
Children’s responses to the value one questions were also compared against chance. The 
responses of all children to the first value one question were significantly different from chance, t 
(124) = 4.41, p < .001. The responses of younger children to the first value question were also 
significantly different from chance, t (62) = 4.36, p < .001. However, the responses of the older 
children were only marginally significant in comparison to chance, t (61) = 1.99, p = .051. The 
older children did not consistently respond either affirmatively or negatively to the question of 
whether the experimenter should get a new toy. For the second value one question of whether the 
experiment should keep the toy, responses were significantly different from chance for younger 
children (t (61) = 2.79, p = .007), older children (t (61) = 3.92, p < .001), and combined age 
groups (t (123) = 4.73, p < .001). Overall, children were more likely to choose to keep the toy (M 
= .77, SD = .43). 
Children’s justifications for their responses for keeping or replacing the toy were elicited 
to examine children’s reasons for choosing to keep or replace the toy. Justifications for the two 
questions were coded separately. For the first question, asking “Should I get a new one?”, 
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responses were coded as Replaceable if a child responded affirmatively and justified the 
response by referring to replaceability. All other responses including “I don’t know,” no 
response, or unclassifiable were coded as ‘other.’ For the second question, “Should I keep this 
one?”, responses were coded as Irreplaceable if a child responded affirmatively and justified the 
response by indicating positive irreplaceable qualities of the toy. All other responses including “I 
don’t know,” no response, or unclassifiable were coded as ‘other.’ Justifications were 
independently coded by the experimenter and a second coder who was unaware of the 
hypotheses of the study. Inter-rater reliability was 90.15% and disagreements were resolved 
through discussion. 
When asked if the experimenter should keep the toy, the older children more often 
answered both yes, and due to qualities pointing to irreplaceable value (see Table 2).  In contrast, 
when children were asked whether the experimenter should get a new toy, younger children 
more often answered yes, because the old, named toy was replaceable because it was “old,” 
“dirty,” “broken,” and a new one would be better (see Table 2).  
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Table 2. Numbers and percentages of responses to value one questions by explanation category and 
age group 
 
“Should I get a new one?” Replaceable Other responses 
Younger 39 (60.94%) 25 (39.06%) 
Older 27 (42.19%) 37 (57.81%) 
“Should I keep this one?” Irreplaceable Other responses 
Younger 27 (42.19%) 37 (57.81%) 
Older 42 (65.63%) 22 (34.38%) 
 
 
 
 
Children’s responses across the two value one questions were also examined. Children’s 
responses across the questions were coded as consistently responding to keep the toy, 
consistently responding to replace the toy, and inconsistent responding. A chi-square analyses 
conducted to examine the affect of age on performance across value questions, was not 
significant, χ2 (2) = .3.079, p = .21.  The majority of children responded inconsistently across the 
two value questions (see Table 3). 
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Table 3.  Responses across value one questions by age group. 
 
 Responses across value one questions 
Age Keep Toy Replace Toy Inconsistent 
Younger 16 10 38 
Older 12 18 34 
 
 
 
Children explanations across the value questions were also examined.  Justifications were 
categorized as consistently referring to value, consistently referring to replaceability, consistently 
other, and inconsistent. Although older children more often than younger children consistently 
mentioned value to justify their responses, a chi-square analysis examining age and justification 
category was not significant, χ2 (3) = 6.56, p = .088 (see Table 4). 
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Table 4. Justifications across value one questions by age group. 
 
 Justifications across value one questions 
 Value Replaceability Other Inconsistent 
Younger 10 20 6 28 
Older 22 13 4 25 
 
 
2.2.2.3    Value 2 Question 
 
The second value question, (“If I have to throw one away, which one should I throw away?”) 
required children to judge the comparable irreplaceability of the named toy and the identical toy 
lacking a name, by selecting one to be thrown away. Responses to the second value question 
were coded as follows. If the second toy, the one labeled with a category label or possessive 
pronoun was chosen, the response was coded as ‘0’. If the toy labeled with a proper name was 
chosen, the response was coded as ‘1.’ Responses of “both,” “none,” and “depends were coded 
as ‘other.’ Responses of “I don’t know” and those in the category ‘other’ were removed from the 
analysis. A dichotomous logistic regression was performed on responses to Value Two with age 
group (younger, older), toy (stuffed toy, toy car), and label condition (category label, possessive 
pronoun) as the predictor variables. All assumptions were met. There were no significant results. 
A logistic regression including sex as an independent variable was also conducted. There were 
no significant results. Whether or not the second toy presented was labeled with a category label 
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or a possessive pronoun did not make a difference in children’s selections of which toy was more 
replaceable. That is, children did not differentiate between the two types of labeled toys in 
contrast to the named toy in terms of irreplaceability.  
To examine the hypothesis that children would be less likely to choose to throw away the 
toy labeled with a proper name, a Chi-square was run on responses to the Value 2 question by 
age. Although a greater number of older children than younger children chose the toy with the 
category label (with or without a possessive pronoun) over the one with the proper name, the 
observed values did not differ significantly from expected values, χ2 (2) = 5.33, p = .070. 
The responses of children to the second value question were also compared against 
chance. Results indicated that responses did not differ significantly from chance for the younger 
children (t (58) = .82, p = .42), the older children (t (53) = -.75, p = .46), or the combined age (t 
(112) = .065, p = .95). 
2.2.2.4  Identity and Value 
 
To examine whether children’s responses to the value two question were related to their ability 
to track identity, three variables were created. For the “Identity” variable, children who selected 
the toy labeled with a proper name for both identity questions received a code of ‘1.’ Children 
who selected the toy referred to by category label for at least one of the identity questions, 
received a code of ‘0.’ For the “Value” variable, children who indicated that the toy labeled with 
a category label should be thrown away received a coding of ‘1’; children who indicated that the 
toy with the proper name should be thrown away received a code of ‘0.’ Finally, combined 
understanding of “Identity & Value,” was constituted by children who scored 1 on both the 
“Identity” and “Value” items.  
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To determine whether children’s responses to the value two question was related to their 
responses to the identity questions, a chi-square with the variables of “Value” and “Identity” was 
conducted, but was not significant, χ2 (1) = 1.048, p = .35. Chi-squares were also conducted for 
each age group and were also not significant (younger: χ2 (1) = 1.50, p = .31, older: χ2 (1) = .21, 
p = .73). However, a chi-square analysis examining understanding both “Identity & Value” by 
Age Group was significant, χ2 (1) = 4.34, p = .037.As depicted in Table 5, overall, while the 
majority of children across age groups failed to understand both identity and value, older 
children more often evidenced consistent understanding. 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Number of children who understand both identity and value by age group 
 
 
 Identity & Value Other Total 
Younger 15 49 64 
Older 26 38 64 
Total 41 87 128 
 
 
 55 
2.3    DISCUSSION 
Study 1a set out to examine children’s ability to use a proper name to track identity as well as 
their understanding of the irreplaceable value linked to proper names. The results of Study 1a 
indicate that older children were better able to track individual identity than younger children. 
The performance of the 4-year-olds was not as consistent as that of the 7-year-old children. The 
responses of the younger children to both of the identity questions did not differ significantly 
from chance. It is possible that in some cases children were interpreting the name as a category 
label, especially for the toy car. Although there was no effect of toy type, that is whether the toy 
was a car or a stuffed elephant, found for the identity questions, children’s spontaneous 
comments suggest that some children did interpret the name as a category label. For example, 
when the second toy car was presented, several children over the course of the interviews asked, 
“Is that another Lyle?” In contrast, when the second toy elephant was presented, one child asked 
what its name was, implying that it would have its own proper name. Children may come across 
multiple instances of named toys, both animate surrogates and branded inanimate objects. 
Previous research has indicated that preschool-aged children are able to keep track of identical 
named toys, such as two Winnie the Poohs, who have different knowledge based on different 
experience (Guthiel et al., 2008). In the present study, the only difference between the two toys, 
in addition to different spatiotemporal locations, was the label used to refer to each toy. In 
addition, in contrast to Guthiel et al. (2008), children had minimal interaction with the toys. The 
children may not have been particularly motivated to keep track of the named toy. If the toy had 
been the child’s own attachment object, the child would likely have been more motivated to track 
the toy, as has been demonstrated in other research (Hood & Bloom, 2008). 
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Surprisingly, children’s responses to the identity questions differed from question to 
question. Children were more likely to correctly identify the named individual on the second 
identity question. Immediately prior to the second identity questions, children were asked to 
choose one of the toys to throw away. It is possible that the action of throwing away the target 
toy drew attention to that toy, which happened to be the target toy, influencing children’s 
responses. 
In terms of responses to the irreplaceable value questions, in contrast to prediction, age 
differences were found between the 4-year-olds and the 7-year-olds. For the open-ended value 
question, younger children were less forthcoming with suggestions for what to do with the old 
and worn toy than were older children. This finding is likely driven by the lesser ability of 
younger children to articulate responses to the open-ended question. Age also influenced 
children’s responses to questions concerning whether the experimenter should get a new toy or 
keep the old one. Younger children were more willing to replace the toy than were older 
children.  In their explanations of their answers, younger children more often pointed to aspects 
of the toy that made it replaceable, such as that it was old, dirty, and broken. In the present study, 
younger children may have focused on the external appearance of the toys rather than on more 
abstract characteristics such as name and relationship (being owned by the experimenter), 
consistent with preschool children’s focus on appearances (Flavell et al., 1983).  
The type of toy also influenced children’s judgments of a toy’s replaceability. Children 
responded more often to replace the toy car than the stuffed toy. This finding suggests that 
children viewed the stuffed toy as more valuable than the toy car. This finding is in accordance 
with other research examining value in that the animate surrogate in this study was viewed by 
participants as less replaceable than the toy car that did not bear any characteristics of animacy 
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(Gray et al., 2007). The finding also corresponds with the finding of Hall and colleagues (2004) 
that children more often list animate surrogates more than inanimate objects as deserving of a 
proper name.  
The label of the toy did not make a difference in terms of irreplaceable value judgments. 
Responses to irreplaceable value questions in the category label condition did not differ 
significantly from those in the possessive pronoun condition. Neither proper name nor ownership 
influenced children’s judgments of replaceability. In their explanations of their responses to the 
irreplaceable value questions, children often referred to the appearance of the toy as a 
justification to get rid of it, regardless of whether or not it had a proper name, or was owned by 
the experimenter. However, this does not mean that children are insensitive the influence of 
names and ownership on the value of objects. In their explanations for the Value 2 question, 
several children did highlight names and other unobservable properties of the toys that they 
viewed as contributing to their value.  For example, one four-year-old justified his selection of a 
toy to be thrown away by offering “because he doesn’t have a name.” More seven-year-olds than 
younger children included names and unobservable qualities in their explanations of their 
answers. One seven-year-old justified throwing away the toy with the category label by 
highlighting its lack of a name in contrast to the named toy, “because the other one has a name.” 
Some children even made inferences based on the differential naming status of the toys: “Lyle 
might have been more special, because that’s just a car and that’s Lyle,” “because I would think 
that you had Shelby longer because it has a name and this one is just named an elephant.” Other 
seven-year-old children inferred that the named toy had a longer history of relationship with the 
experimenter: “because that one [my elephant], well you haven’t had it very long and Shelby 
you’ve had for very long,” “because you really don’t know that one [child pointed to a car], but 
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this one [child pointed to Lyle] has a lot of your memories,” “because you love that one [child 
pointed to Lyle] more.” 
Finally, analyses of children’s responses across identity and value questions indicated 
that overall, children did not tend to both accurately track the identity of the named toy and 
indicate that it was irreplaceable. In this regard, identity and value judgments were not tightly 
linked. However, older children were significantly more likely than younger children to both 
accurately track the named toy and to deem it as irreplaceable. These results suggest that with 
age children become better able to utilize proper names to track individual toys and to recognize 
the irreplaceable value that accompanies a proper name. 
The results of Study 1a demonstrated that children do value stuffed toys as less 
replaceable than toy cars, however, there was no evidence that proper names influence 
judgments of irreplaceable value. Study 1a demonstrated children’s ability to use proper names 
to track individuals in contrast to identical, but unnamed others, across changes in physical 
position. However, are children able to use proper names to track individuals across a magical 
transfer of identity? Study 1b examined children’s ability to use proper names to track individual 
identity as construed in mental terms.  
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3.0    STUDY 1B: PROPER NAME VERSUS MIND TRANSFER STUDY 
The purpose of Study 1b was to examine whether children are able to use proper names to track 
mentalistic, subjective identity before they are able to do so with minds. Previous research 
suggests that five-year-old children are beginning to be able to track individual identity using 
mind when the transfer crosses category boundaries (Corriveau et al., 2005). The understanding 
of the brain as the location of mentalistic or subjective identity continues to develop into middle 
childhood (Corriveau et al., 2005; Johnson, 1990). However, other researchers argue that even 
babies have a tendency to think in terms of dualism (Bloom, 2004; Kuhlmeier, et al., 2004). In 
this view, it is intuitive to think of people as comprised of minds and bodies that are separable. 
Although the evidence suggests that young children are a bit confused when it comes to tracking 
subjective identity using mind, proper name understanding emerges early (Jusczyk& Mandel-
Emer, 1997). Perhaps children are able to use proper names to track both bodily and subjective 
identity before they have a full-fledged understanding of subjective or mentalistic identity as 
rooted in the mind or brain. In this view, proper names might serve as a vehicle for subjective 
identity. 
Building on previous research (Corriveau et al., 2005; Johnson, 1990; Liittschwager, 
1994), the present study also employed hypothetical magical situations to examine conceptions 
of identity. Children were presented with stories in which a target character’s identity was 
magically transferred to the body of either a person or a dog. The magical transfer involved 
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either the proper name or the mind of the target character. Children were subsequently asked 
which character now possessed different aspects of the target character’s subjective identity, as 
defined as feelings, preferences/traits and memories/knowledge. These questions were asked to 
determine whether children judge subjective identity as remaining with the body, or following 
the transfer of mind or proper name. 
The different categories involved in hypothetical transplants and transformations have 
been demonstrated to have an effect on judgments of continued identity. Older children 
demonstrate some difficulty tracking identity in person-to-person brain transplants in contrast to 
person-to-pig transplants (Johnson, 1990; Corriveau et al., 2005). Even adults offer lower 
identity continuity scores for within basic-level category transformations than for those that cross 
basic-level categories (Rhemtulla & Hall, 2009). Therefore, Study 1b also examined whether the 
ontological category (person or dog) influences children’s ability to track identity across a 
magical transfer of either proper name or mind. That is, do children have an easier time 
accepting a transfer of a person’s identity when the recipient is a dog, than when it is another 
person, as suggested by the findings of previous research (Johnson, 1990; Rhemtulla & Hall, 
2009)? 
Children aged four and seven years were chosen to participate in the study. Four year 
olds were chosen because at that age children are beginning to demonstrate an understanding of 
mind as evidenced in the passing of false-belief tasks (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). 
However, this understanding does not extend to the conceptualization of the mind as the locus of 
identity or the brain as a container for thoughts (Corriveau et al., 2005; Gottfried et al., 1999). 
Although preschoolers understand that the mind and brain are required for thinking, it is not until 
around 7 years of age that children demonstrate a relatively firm understanding of mind and 
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brain as the locus of identity and as a container for thoughts and memories (Corriveau et al., 
2005; Gottfried et al., 1999; Johnson, 1990). Thus, these two ages groups were compared to 
examine developmental differences in children’s understanding of mind and proper name as 
vehicles for subjective identity. 
In addition, questions concerning irreplaceable value were included to explore whether 
children would be able to infer value, defined as irreplaceability, based on the transfer of 
subjective identity. In the value questions, value was defined as irreplaceability based on the 
emotional connection between friends: which character the friend would want with him/her, and 
which one the friend would not choose to leave behind in the woods. It was assumed that the 
friend would recognize the target’s subjective identity as the essence of the friend, and would 
thus want that part of the friend rather than the body of the target. It was thus hypothesized that 
participants would choose the recipient of the transfer as more valuable and less replaceable than 
the target character. In addition, given developmental differences in children’s understanding of 
subjective identity (Corriveau et al., 2005), it was hypothesized that younger children would be 
less likely than older children to choose the recipient as more valuable. In addition, since 
research with adults indicates that entities with greater agency are more valued than those with 
less (Gray et al., 2007), it was also hypothesized that if younger participants are more focused on 
the external appearance of the character, they would judge a dog with a person’s subjective 
identity as less valuable than a person with another person’s subjective identity.  
Overall, given the findings of previous research, it was hypothesized that older children 
would demonstrate a better understanding of identity as separable from the body than would 
younger children. If young children are able to conceptualize subjective identity as connected to 
proper names even before they fully understand mind as the location of identity, then in Study 1b 
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younger children would be expected to demonstrate a better understanding of the proper name 
than mind as a vehicle for subjective identity. However, given the results of previous research, it 
was hypothesized that older children would perform similarly for both proper name and mind. In 
terms of the category of the transfer recipient, it was hypothesized that overall, subjective 
identity scores would be higher for the transfer involving the dog than for the transfer involving a 
person. For the irreplaceable value questions, it was hypothesized that responses would depend 
on the age of the participant, with younger children less successful in tracking subjective identity 
across the transfer and thus demonstrating lower irreplaceable value scores. Finally, it was also 
hypothesized that if children are more focused on external characteristics than subjective 
identity, even if they are successful in tracking that identity, their responses to the irreplaceable 
value questions would depend on whether the recipient of the post-transfer individual was a dog 
or a person. 
3.1    METHOD 
3.1.1    Participants 
Participants included 64 four-old (mean: 4.77, range: 3.97-5.88) and 64 seven-year-old children 
(mean: 7.31, range: 6.17-8.78). These participants also participated in Study 1a. There were 16 
participants in each of four conditions (proper name-person, proper name-dog and mind-person, 
mind-dog) per age group (younger and older), for a total of 128 participants. The participants 
were recruited from preschools and schools in Grand Rapids, MI, and preschool and afterschool 
programs in Pittsburgh, PA. Children were tested individually at their schools.  
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3.1.2    Design 
The between-subjects variables are Vehicle (Proper Name, Mind), Category of Post-Transfer 
Individual (Person, Dog), and Age (4-year-olds and 7-year-olds).  
3.1.3    Procedure 
Each participant was presented with one story about a magical transfer of identity. For half of the 
participants, the transfer was marked by an uncommon proper name and for the other half it was 
marked by mind. In addition, within both the proper name and mind conditions, half the 
participants received a story involving a person to person transfer and half received a story 
involving a person to dog transfer.  
In all vignettes, participants were shown pictures of two people and either a third person 
or a dog. Two of the people, the target and the friend (witness to the magical transfer), were 
labeled with a proper name. The third entity was the post-transfer host (either an unnamed person 
or an unnamed dog). In the experimental session, the experimenter first presented the children 
with a picture of either a girl or boy (depending on the gender of the participant), and indicated 
the name of the character (e.g., “This is Sally”). Children then received three pieces of 
information about subjective aspects of the target character: a feeling (e.g., happy), a preference 
or trait (e.g., likes ice cream), and a memory or knowledge (e.g., knows how to tie shoelaces). 
Then the experimenter presented a picture of another child (a boy or girl depending on the 
gender of the participant) and indicated that the child was the target character’s friend (e.g., 
“This is Sally’s friend Juniper”). Then the experimenter presented a picture of either another 
child or a dog, and labeled the third character with a category label (e.g., “This is another 
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girl/boy” or “This is a dog”). The three characters were places in front of the child. A story was 
then told about an encounter in the woods with a wizard (whose picture was shown) resulting in 
a magical transfer (“One day Sally, Juniper, and the other girl went for a walk in the woods. 
While they were walking, they met a wizard”). Each time a character was mentioned, the 
experimenter pointed to that character. In the proper name condition, the story describes that the 
wizard put the named target individual into the post-transfer host (either a person or a dog): “The 
wizard said ‘abracadabra’ and put Sally [experimenter pointed to target] in the dog’s/other girl’s 
body [experimenter pointed to third character]. Now Sally is in the dog’s/other girl’s body.” In 
the mind condition, the wizard puts the target’s mind into the post-transfer host (“The wizard 
said ‘abracadabra’ and put her mind [experimenter pointed to target] into the dog’s/other girl’s 
body [experimenter pointed to third character].  Now her mind is in the dog’s/other girl’s body”). 
The wording of the stories was intentionally ambiguous concerning the structure of the transfer 
(fusion, displacement). Finally, the experimenter drew attention to the friend as a witness to the 
event: for example, “Juniper saw everything that happened.” 
At the end of each vignette, children were asked a series of questions by the 
experimenter.  First, they were presented with comprehension check questions to ensure they 
understood the story. (“Which one looks like Sally [the target]?,” “Which one is Juniper [the 
friend]?,” and “What did the wizard do?”). Incorrect responses were corrected with a repetition 
of the story and the data of children who do not understand the correction were excluded from 
analyses. Seventeen 4-year-olds and three 7-year-olds were corrected. Since, all twenty of these 
participants indicated that they understood the correction by correctly answering the repeated 
comprehension questions, none of the participants were excluded from analyses. Participants 
were presented with a total of five test questions: one identity question, three subjective 
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questions, and two value questions (see Appendix A). The identity question requested 
participants to indicate the location of the target individual post transfer (e.g., “Where is Sally 
now?”). The three subjective questions made reference to the three pieces of subjective 
information included in the story. The value questions involved a choice of which entity should 
be left behind and which individual the friend would really want to be with. For each of the 
questions, participants indicated their answers by pointing. After participants responded to each 
question, they were asked for an explanation of their response. 
3.2    RESULTS 
3.2.1    Tracking Identity 
Given the possibility that children might have interpreted the transfer scenario as involving an 
incorporation of the bodies of target and recipient, responses to the identity question were 
analyzed separately from the responses to the subjective questions. Answers to the identity 
question, “Where is [name of character] now?,” were coded as to whether participants pointed to 
the recipient of the transfer (1), or to one of the other characters (0). 
To determine whether participants’ responses to the identity question were influenced by 
the independent variables, a Poisson Regression was used to analyze the data (due to a violation 
of the homogeneity of variance assumption). An initial Poisson Regression was performed on 
identity scores with sex (male, female), age group (younger, older), vehicle (mind, proper name), 
and category (person, dog) as predictors. There were no significant effects of sex. Subsequently, 
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a Poisson Regression was performed on identity with age group (younger, older), vehicle (mind, 
proper name), and category (person, dog) as predictors. All assumptions were met. 
The vehicle condition was significant with the recipient of the transfer chosen more often 
in the proper name condition (M = .84, SE = .047) than in the mind condition (M = .58, SE = 
.066), χ2 (1) = 8.72, p = .003. In addition, the age group x vehicle interaction was significant, χ2 
(1) = 4.42, p = .036. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the difference between vehicle 
conditions was significant for the older children, χ2 (1) = 14.79, p < .001, but not for the younger 
children, χ2 (1) = 2.073, p = .15. As shown in Figure 1, children in the proper name condition 
more often pointed to the recipient as the bearer of the proper name, than those in the mind 
condition, and this effect was especially pronounced among children in the older age group. 
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Figure 1. Mean scores for identity by age group and identity vehicle. 
 
3.2.2    Tracking Subjective Identity 
In order to test influences of age, identity vehicle, and ontological category, on children’s ability 
to track identity across a magical transfer, responses to the subjective questions were examined. 
Scores for subjective identity were created by combining the responses to the three subjective 
questions. If a participant pointed to the recipient of the transfer, indicating that subjective 
identity was judged as having been transferred from target to recipient, the response was coded 
as ‘1.’ All other responses were coded as ‘0.’ Subject Identity scores ranged from 0-3. 
Due to a violation of the homogeneity of variance assumption, a Poisson Regression was 
used to analyze the data. An initial Poisson Regression was performed on subjective identity 
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scores with sex (male, female), age group (younger, older), vehicle (mind, proper name), and 
category (person, dog) as predictors. There were no significant effects of sex. Subsequently, a 
Poisson Regression was performed on subjective identity scores with age group (younger, older), 
vehicle (mind, proper name), and category (person, dog) as predictors. All assumptions were 
met. 
Overall, there were significant effects of each of the three independent variables (χ2 (7) = 
36.22, p < .001). There was a significant prediction of subjective identity scores by age group, 
(χ2 (1) = 36.01, p < .001. Overall older children had higher subjective identity scores (M = 2.67, 
SE = .16) than younger children (M = 1.42, SE = .12). That is, older children were more likely to 
understand that the subjective identity of the target individual was transferred to the body of the 
recipient. Subjective identity scores were also significantly predicted by vehicle (χ2 (1) = 6.21, p 
= .013). Overall, subjective identity scores were higher for mind (M = 2.22, SE = .17) than for 
proper name (M = 1.71, SE = .12). Participants were more likely to judge that the subjective 
identity of the target individual was transferred to the recipient in the mind condition than in the 
proper name condition. In addition, subjective identity scores were significantly predicted by 
ontological category (χ2 (1) = 15.22, p < .001). Subjective identity scores were higher for person 
(M = 2.39, SE = .17) than for dog (M = 1.59, SE = .12). Participants were more likely to judge 
that the subjective identity of the target was transferred when the recipient was a person than 
when it was a dog. 
The age group x vehicle interaction was also significant (χ2 (1) = 5.70, p = .017). As 
shown in Figure 2, younger children had higher subjective identity scores for mind (M = 1.84, SE 
= .23) than for proper name (M = 1.10, SE = .13), whereas for older children, there was no 
significant difference between mind (M = 2.68, SE = .24) and proper name (M = 2.65, SE = .20).  
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Pairwise comparisons revealed that the difference between scores for mind and proper name was 
significant for the younger children (χ2 (1) = 7.61, p = .006), but not for the older children. In 
contrast to expectations, younger children were more likely to judge that subjective identity was 
transferred to the recipient in the mind condition than in the proper name condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean subjective identity scores by age group and identity vehicle. 
 
 
Furthermore, the vehicle x category interaction was also significant (χ2 (1) = 6.39, p = 
.011).  Subjective identity scores for dog were higher in the mind condition (M = 2.01, SE = .22) 
than in the proper name condition (M = 1.22, SE = .13). Pairwise comparisons revealed that this 
difference was significant for dog (χ2 (1) = 10.57, p = .001), but not for person (see Figure 3). 
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Transfer of subjective identity was more likely to have been judged to occur for dog in the mind 
condition than in the proper name condition. The vehicle of identity, mind or proper name, did 
not influence responses when the recipient of the transfer of identity was a person.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3. Mean subjective identity scores by ontological category and identity vehicle.  
 
Explanations were elicited to determine whether children took into account the transfer in 
answering the subjective identity questions. The explanation for each subjective identity question 
was coded according to whether participants mentioned the transfer (e.g., “because the wizard 
switched their minds,” “because he’s a dog now”), appealed to the story or appearance (e.g., 
“because she is the one who knows,” “because he lost his sweater”), or provided some other 
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explanation (“I don’t know,” no response, unclassifiable). Explanations were coded by the 
experimenter and another coder blind to the hypotheses. Inter-rater reliability was 95.31% and 
differences were resolved through discussion. 
In their explanations, older children mentioned the transfer more often than any other 
type of response and more often than the younger children (see Table 6). However, children’s 
explanations also revealed variation in how children interpreted the transfer scenario. Some 
children interpreted the scenario, not as a one-way transfer of identity, but as a switch of bodies: 
“the wizard changed the bodies.” Others interpreted the result of the wizard’s action as a fusion 
of the two characters: “now they are one.” Several children interpreted the situation as resulting 
in the recipient’s stomach as the location of the target character: “Sally is in the girl’s stomach.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Percentages of explanations for subjective identity questions by age group and justification 
category. 
 
 Transfer Story Other 
Younger 26.17% 15.63% 58.20% 
Older 58.20% 10.55% 31.25% 
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3.2.3    Judgments of Irreplaceable Value 
The responses to the irreplaceable value questions were combined to create one value variable. 
Responses were coded according to whether participants had tracked the identity of the target to 
the recipient, and recognized that the friend would choose the subjective identity of his or her 
friend (the target) as more irreplaceable than the other character. Thus, for the first value 
question (“Who should [the Friend] leave behind in the woods?”), responses that included the 
recipient received a ‘0’. All other responses received a 1. For the second value question (“Which 
one does [the Friend] really want with him/her?”), responses that included the recipient received 
a ‘1’ and all other responses received a 0. An irreplaceable value score was created by summing 
the scores for the two value questions, with possible scores ranging from 0-2. 
An initial Poisson Regression was performed on irreplaceable value scores with sex 
(male, female), age group (younger, older), vehicle (mind, proper name), and category (person, 
dog) as predictors. All assumptions were met.  There were no significant effects of sex. 
Subsequently, a Poisson Regression was performed on irreplaceable value scores with age group 
(younger, older), vehicle (mind, proper name), and category (person, dog) as predictors. All 
assumptions were met. Overall, there was no significant prediction of any of the predictor 
variables on the irreplaceable value scores. In contrast to expectations, neither age group nor 
category influenced participants’ responses to the irreplaceable value questions.  
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3.2.4 Identity and Value 
Analyses were also conducted to determine whether children’s understanding of irreplaceable 
value was in any way connected to their understanding of subjective identity continuity. 
A chi-square analysis was run to examine whether participants who understood 
subjective identity as having been transferred also understood the value of the transferred 
subjective identity. The numbers of participants who understood subjective identity (by having 
responded on 2-3 questions that subjective identity had been transferred) and the number of those 
who understood value continuity (by having responded on 1-2 of the value questions that the 
transferred subjective identity was valuable) were examined in a chi-square analyses, χ2 (1) = 
6.22, p = .013. As seen in Table 7, participants who understood subjective identity more often 
also interpreted that identity as irreplaceable and thus valuable. However, a similar number of 
those who did not interpret subjective identity as having been transferred also judged that 
identity as irreplaceably valuable. In addition, those who did not respond that subjective identity 
was irreplaceable more often did not transfer subjective identity. 
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Table 7. Number of participants who understood and did not understand irreplaceable value and 
subjective identity. 
 
 
 Understand Subjective Identity 
Understand 
Irreplaceable Value 
Yes No Total 
Yes 48 44 92 
No 10 26 36 
Total 58 70 128 
 
 
 
To examine individual response patterns across question types, a new variable of 
response pattern was created. Participants demonstrating a strong subjective identity stance, by 
responding that individual identity was transferred and that subjective identity was transferred on 
at least two of the three subjective identity questions and responded that the subjective identity of 
the target was valued as irreplaceable on at least one of the value questions, received a score of 
“1.” Participants who tracked subjective identity across the transfer and who responded that this 
identity was valued on at least one of the value questions, but who responded that subjective 
identity was tracked on less than 2 of the subjective identity questions received a score of “2.” 
Participants who either got identity only or identity and subjective identity but not value received 
a score of “3.” All other response patterns received a score of “4.” 
A Chi-Square analyses examining the number of participants in each age group who fell 
into each response category indicated that older children more often transferred both identity and 
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subjective identity and viewed identity as irreplaceably valuable, χ2 (3) = 1.589E1, p = .001 (see 
Table 8).   
 
 
 
Table 8. Response category by age group. 
 
 
 Response Category 
 All ID and Value ID and 
Subjective and 
ID only 
Other 
Younger 8 21 13 22 
Older 26 10 15 13 
 
 
3.2.5 Analyses across studies 1a and 1b 
In order to compare participants’ performance on identity and irreplaceable value questions 
across studies, several variables were created. For Study 1a, to examine whether children’s 
responses to the value two question were related to their ability to track identity, three variables 
were created. For the “Understand Identity” variable, children who selected the toy labeled with 
a proper name for both identity questions received a code of ‘1.’ Children who selected the toy 
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referred to by category label for at least one of the identity questions, received a code of ‘0.’ For 
the “Understand Irreplaceable Value” variable, responses to the value two question that indicated 
that the toy labeled with a category label should be thrown away received a coding of ‘1.’ 
Responses to the value two question indicating that the toy with the proper name should be 
thrown away received a code of ‘0.’ Finally, for the variable of “Understand Both,” if children 
received scores of 1 for both “Understand Identity” and “Understand Irreplaceable Value,” then 
they received a code of ‘1.’ If the total score for the sum of “Understand Identity” and 
“Understand Irreplaceable Value” was less than 2, then the participant was given a code of ‘0.’ 
For Study 1b, to examine individual response patterns across question types, a new 
variable of response pattern was created. Participants demonstrating a strong immaterial identity 
stance, by responding that individual identity was transferred and that subjective identity was 
transferred on at least two of the three subjective identity questions and responded that the 
subjective identity of the target was valued as irreplaceable on at least one of the irreplaceable 
value questions, received a score of “1.” Participants who tracked identity across the transfer and 
who responded that this identity was valued on at least one of the value questions, but who 
responded that subjective identity was tracked on less than 2 of the subjective identity questions 
received a score of “2.” Participants who either got identity only or identity and subjective 
identity but not value received a score of “3.” All other response patterns received a score of “4.” 
In addition, a new variable combining responses to the identity questions from both study 
1a and study 1b was created to examine the performance of individuals across studies. 
Participants who successfully tracked identity in Study 1a and responded that identity was 
transferred in Study 1b received a score of “2.” Participants who successfully tracked identity in 
either Study 1 a or 1b but not in the other, received a score of “1.” Participants who did not 
 77 
successfully track identity in Study 1a and who did not view immaterial identity as having been 
transferred in Study 1b, received a score of “0.” 
Analyses were conducted to determine whether children who were successful at tracking 
identity in Study 1a also tracked identity across the magical transfer in Study 1b. Older children 
more often than younger children successfully tracked identity in both studies, with none of the 
older children failing to track identity in both studies (see Table 9). A chi-square conducted on 
age group and identity tracking across Studies 1a and 1b was significant, χ2 (2) = 2.33E1, p < 
.001.  
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Identity tracking patterns of children across studies by age group 
 
 Identity Tracking Across Studies 1a and 1b 
Age Both yes Yes and no Both no Total 
Younger 20 31 13 64 
Older 42 22 0 64 
Total 62 53 13 128 
 
 
 
Children’s performance on the Irreplaceable Value questions was also examined across 
studies 1a and 1b. Of those participants who responded that subjective identity was irreplaceably 
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value in Study 1b, half of the participants viewed the named toy in Study 1a as irreplaceable and 
half did not, as shown in Table 10. A chi-square analysis of performance on responses to the 
value two question in Study 1a and the value questions in Study 1b was significant, χ2 (1) = 3.96, 
p = .047. However, a chi-square analysis examining the age group and performance on the value 
questions across studies revealed that age group was not significantly related to understanding 
irreplaceable value, χ2 (2) = .55, p = .76. 
 
 
 
 
Table 10.   Responses to value questions across studies 1a and 1b. 
 
 Irreplaceable Value Across Studies 1a and 1b 
Age Both yes Yes and no Both no Total 
Younger 21 30 13 64 
Older 25 27 12 64 
Total 46 57 25 128 
3.3    DISCUSSION 
Study 1b set out to examine whether children are able to use proper names to track mentalistic, 
subjective identity before they are able to do so with minds. Overall, older children demonstrated 
higher subjective identity scores than did younger children. That is, older children were more 
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likely than younger children to track subjective identity via magical transfer from target to 
recipient. This result is consistent with the findings of previous research that have shown that 
older children have a better understanding of mentalistic, subjective identity than do younger 
children, as demonstrated in magical transformation and hypothetical brain transplant scenarios 
(Corriveau et al., 2005; Johnson, 1990). Furthermore, in their explanations of the responses, 
older children mentioned the transfer more than younger children did. The older children 
appeared to better understand the transfer scenario and its consequences for the subjective 
identity of the target character. 
The vehicle of identity did make a difference, although not as expected. Subjective 
identity scores were higher in the mind condition than in the proper name condition. Participants 
more often judged that subjective identity was transferred to a recipient when mind was used 
than when proper name was used. This difference in subjective identity scores between proper 
name and mind conditions was especially pronounced in the performance of the younger 
children. When looking at responses to the identity question (“Where is [named character] 
now?”), the scores of both younger and older children were higher in the proper name condition 
than in the mind condition. In contrast, younger children had higher subjective identity scores in 
the mind condition than in the proper name condition, although the vehicle of identity did not 
make a difference for the older children. Although children in the proper name condition judged 
the recipient as bearer of the target character’s name more often than those in the mind condition, 
this did not mean that they necessarily interpreted that subjective identity went along with the 
name. For younger children, mind rather than proper name, seemed to serve as a conceptually 
easier vehicle for the transfer of a subjective, mentalistic identity. It is possible that for younger 
children it was easier to think of mind as a container of thoughts, memories, and preferences that 
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can be removed from one individual and placed in another. A proper name may have been too 
abstract and ambiguous to the younger children to serve as an effective vehicle for the subjective 
aspects of identity, since proper names are usually used to refer to an embodied individual, 
encompassing both body and mind. 
The category of the post-transfer individual was also a significant predictor of subjective 
identity scores. Overall, subjective identity scores were higher for person than for dog. This 
finding contrasts with Rhemtulla and Hall (2009) who found that with adults, personal identity is 
judged to persist more in cross-basic than in within-basic transformations, and with Johnson’s 
(1990) finding that children had a more difficult time with transferring subjective identity in 
child-to-child brain transplants, than in those involving a pig or a baby as recipient.  However, 
the finding concurs with that of Liittschwager (1995) who observed a gradual decline in 
children’s identity persistence judgments from minor changes to transformations crossing the 
boundaries of ontological categories. The children in the present study appeared more willing to 
transfer subjective identity in person-to-person transfers than in person-to dog transfers. 
Within the dog condition, the vehicle of subjective identity also made a difference. 
Subjective identity scores for dog were higher in the mind condition than in the proper name 
condition, although the scores for person did not significantly vary between identity vehicle 
conditions. The person-to-dog transfer may have been more difficult for children especially 
when the transfer involved proper name only. Children in the mind condition may have had an 
easier time conceptualizing the person-to-dog transfer, perhaps using the mind as a container of 
identity metaphor (Gottfried et al, 1999).  
In terms of irreplaceable value, none of the predictor variables were significant. In 
contrast to the hypothesis and despite the significant effect of age found for the subjective 
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identity questions, younger and older children did not differ significantly in their responses to the 
value questions. One of the questions used to gauge value judgments required children to chose 
which character the friend should leave behind in the woods. Several participants did not like this 
question, suggesting that it was mean and that the friend should not leave anyone behind. In 
addition, the category of the transfer recipient did not influence responses to the value questions. 
A dog housing a human subjective identity was judged as no less valuable (in terms of getting 
left behind, or not wanted by the friend) than a person housing the subjective identity of a 
different person.  
In looking at children’s performance across both identity and value questions, the 
majority of children who interpreted subjective identity as having been transferred also judged 
that subjective identity as irreplaceably valuable. This finding suggests that the understanding of 
the irreplaceable value of subjective identity is dependent on and a later developmental 
achievement from mere understanding of subjective identity. 
Analyses across Studies 1a and 1b revealed that older children more successfully tracked 
identity in both studies. None of the older children failed to track identity in both studies. The 
results for irreplaceable value were less clear-cut. Of those children who seemed to understand 
value in the transfer scenario, less than a third also responded that the named toy should be kept 
and not thrown away. Taking the results of these two studies together, ability to track identity 
develops with age and understanding irreplaceable value is a more complex and context-
dependent process. 
The results of Study 1b indicate that younger children have more difficulty using proper 
names than minds as vehicles for subjective individual identity. However, questions concerning 
bodily identity were not included in Study 1b. Do children view identity as separable into 
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subjective and physical components as suggested by the idea of intuitive dualism? In addition, in 
both the proper name and mind conditions, proper names were used to refer to the target 
character, even though when the actual transfer was described, that proper name was only 
mentioned in the proper name condition. Does a proper name serve as a better vehicle for 
subjective identity than other types of labels, such as trait labels? Also, the transfer recipients 
were limited to a person and a dog, and did not include an inanimate object, lacking mental 
states. In Study 2, questions about physical identity were added. In addition, proper names were 
contrasted with trait labels rather than with mind. Furthermore, an inanimate object, a stone, was 
included as a recipient of the magical transfer of subjective identity. 
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4.0     STUDY 2: PROPER NAME VERSUS TRAIT LABEL TRANSFER STUDY 
Study 2 examined the ability of children and adults to use proper names versus trait labels to 
track subjective identity across magical transfers differing in degree of ontological distance from 
the target individual. The purpose of the study was to determine whether children are able to use 
both proper names and trait labels equally well to track individual identity. In addition, in Study 
2, the effect of the category of the transfer recipient on identity tracking was examined. Finally, 
Study 2 also explored the influence of both label and category on irreplaceable value judgments. 
Trait labels and proper names serve distinct functions. Whereas proper names are used to 
pick out individuals, trait labels can be applied to more than one individual. A trait label 
describes an aspect of a person (e.g., nice, smart), but does not distinguish that person as a 
unique individual. Although some philosophers argue that proper names are themselves 
descriptive (Garcia-Ramirez & Shatz, 2011), psychological evidence supports the view that 
names do not function in the same way as descriptions (Garcia-Ramirez & Shatz, 2011). 
However, this research did not examine the distinction between descriptive labels and proper 
names in terms of tracking subjective identity. Can a descriptor like a trait label serve the same 
function as a proper name to track the transfer of subjective identity?  
In the developmental literature, both traits and mind are central to children’s developing 
understanding of identity (Johnson, 1990). Young children use trait labels to make inferences 
about psychological states and future behavior (Alvarez, Ruble, & Bolger, 2001; Gelman & 
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Heyman, 1999; Heyman & Gelman, 1999; 2000). Although children as young as three years of 
age are able to make inductive inferences from trait labels, such as “nice,” they have yet to 
coordinate these traits into a coherent concept of individual identity (Johnson, 1990). Are 
children able to use trait labels as a vehicle for tracking subjective identity (apart from 
appearance) before they have obtained a coherent understanding of traits?  
Study 2 contrasted proper names with trait labels to determine whether proper names are 
unique in acting as a vehicle for subjective identity. Given the results of Study 1b for children’s 
responses to the identity question, it was expected that younger children would identify the 
transfer recipient as the bearer of the proper name. It was hypothesized that the tracking of 
identity of participants in the trait label condition would depend on age with younger children 
less able to use trait labels to track individual identity across a magical transfer. However, given 
the results of Study 1b concerning tracking subjective identity, it was expected that even though 
children are able to track the identity of character across the transfer, as measured by location of 
the name or label of the character, overall, older children and adults would be more successful in 
tracking subjective identity than would younger children. Additionally, if children are able to use 
trait labels to organize individual identity in the same way that they use proper names, then there 
should be no difference between the two label conditions. However, if proper names uniquely act 
as a vehicle for subjective identity, then there should be observed differences in subjective 
identity scores between the proper name and trait label conditions. Furthermore, there might be 
an effect of age, with older children and adults, who have a better understanding of traits and 
their connection to identity, being better able to use trait labels as vehicles for subjective identity.  
In Study 2, physical identity was contrasted with subjective identity. In the scenarios, in 
addition to the appearance of the target character in the picture, the experimenter mentioned an 
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unobservable physical condition (e.g., “he has a scrape on his knee). Tracking of physical 
identity was gauged by questions concerning the appearance and physical characteristic of the 
target character. This contrast between physical and subjective identity was added to examine 
whether children would distinguish between the two in terms of the result of the magical transfer. 
According to intuitive dualism, these two aspects of identity should be easily separated. For 
example, in some versions of afterlife beliefs, the soul is separated from the body. How do we 
conceptually track both aspects of the deceased individual, the physical remains and the 
immaterial soul? In the course of each magical transfer scenario, the physical identity of the 
target character does not change. Given that even young children have no problem in tracking 
individuals using spatiotemporal cues, it was expected that there would be no age difference in 
responses to the physical identity questions. 
Study 2 also expanded the degree of ontological distance from the target to the recipient 
in testing transfer recipients. As in Study 1b, person and dog were included as recipients of 
identity in the magical transformation. In Study 2, stone was added to examine the effect of an 
entity of greater ontological distance from the target. In research in which participants were 
presented with transformations, ontological distance influenced identity continuity judgments 
(Liittschwager, 1995). In Study 1b, the ontological category of the transfer recipient did not 
influence participants’ responses to the question of the post-transfer location of the named target 
identity. Thus, it was predicted in Study 2 that ontological category would not affect responses to 
the identity question, “Where is [target character] now?”  In contrast, given the results of both 
Liittschwager’s (1995) research and Study 1b, it was predicted that subjective identity scores 
would be highest for person-to-person transfer, and lower for person-to-dog and person-to-stone 
transfers. However, other research suggests that categorically different hypothetical transplant 
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recipients may be conceptually easier to imagine as possessing the target’s subjective identity 
(Johnson, 1990). It is also possible that scores would be higher for the transfer involving the dog 
than for the one involving a person if a within-category transfer is conceptually more difficult 
than a cross-category transfer (Johnson, 1990; Rhemtulla & Hall, 2009). A transplant or transfer 
between two equivalent people could entail competing subjectivities (Cohen & Barrett, 2008). 
The addition of a stone as a transfer recipient, provided an example of an ontologically different 
entity that distinctly lacks a mentalistic, subjective identity. Subjective identity scores for stone 
were predicted to be higher than those for person and dog since a stone does not possess a mental 
identity that could compete with that of the target character.  
Does the type of label used to refer to an individual, influence judgments of value? 
Jeshion (2009) emphasizes that proper names uniquely serve to mark the irreplaceable value of 
the individual. A trait label, such as “nice girl” can be used to refer to more than one person, and 
thus does not necessarily refer to an individual who cannot be replaced, since there are other girls 
who could be considered “nice.” Questions concerning value were also included to determine 
whether a proper name is interpreted as marking greater value relative to that marked by trait 
labels. If proper names mark value in a way that trait labels do not, it would be expected that 
irreplaceable value scores would be lower in the trait label condition, especially in the child 
groups.  
Finally, Study 2 further examines whether the ontological category of transfer recipient 
influenced judgments of irreplaceable value. Building on Study 1b, Study 2 explored the effect 
of category on value judgments. In Study 1b, ontological category did not influence judgments of 
irreplaceable value. However, in Study 1b, both transfer recipients were agents. In Study 2, a 
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stone was included to determine whether the target’s subjective identity would be considered less 
valuable when housed in an animate object than when occupying the body of another agent.  
4.1    METHOD 
4.1.1    Participants 
Participants include 32 four-year-olds (mean: 5.05, range: 3.90 - 5.68), 34 seven-year-olds 
(mean: 7.53, range: 6.09 - 8.45), and 42 adults (mean: 19.49, range: 18.20 – 22.11). The child 
participants were recruited from preschools and schools in Grand Rapids, MI, and preschool and 
afterschool programs in Pittsburgh, PA. Children were tested individually at their schools. Adults 
were recruited from the introductory psychology subject pool at a public university in Pittsburgh, 
PA. 
4.1.2    Design 
The between-subjects variables were Label Type (two levels) and Age (three levels). The two 
levels of Label Type were proper name and trait label. The three levels of Age were four-year-
old children, seven-year-old children, and adults. The within-subjects variable was Category of 
Post-Transformation Individual (three levels). The three levels of Category were person, animal 
(dog), and inanimate object (stone).  
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4.1.3    Procedure 
Each participant was presented with three vignettes in one of two label conditions: proper name 
condition or trait label condition (see Appendix B). In the proper name condition, the target 
individual was labeled with an uncommon proper name. In the trait label condition each target 
individual was labeled with a category label (girl, boy) modified by a trait (nice, ice-cream lover, 
smart). The target person was either a girl or boy, the animal was a dog, and the inanimate object 
was a stone. These entities were chosen to represent categories of varying ontological distance 
from the target individual. In total, there were three within-subjects conditions: 1) person-to-
person, 2) person-to-dog, and 3) person-to-stone. Participants received three items of information 
about subjective aspects of the target: a feeling (e.g., happy), a preference or trait (e.g., likes ice 
cream), and a memory or knowledge (e.g., knows how to tie shoelaces).  The vignettes also 
included one item about a physical aspect of the target (e.g., has a stubbed toe). The presentation 
order of the stories was counterbalanced across participants within the proper name and trait 
label conditions.  
During the experimental session the experimenter first presented child participants with a 
picture of either a girl or boy (matched to the gender of the participant), and identified the 
character with either a proper name or a trait label, depending on the condition (e.g., “This is 
Cleo,” “This is the smart girl”). Children then received three pieces of information about the 
target character. This information included a trait, an emotion, knowledge, and a physical 
condition (e.g., a scrape on the knee). Then the experimenter introduced the picture of another 
child, the target’s friend (e.g., proper name condition: “This is Cleo’s friend Millie”; trait 
condition: “This is her friend”).  The experimenter then showed a picture of the third character: a 
person, a dog, or a stone (“This is another girl/boy/a dog/a stone”). During the introduction of the 
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characters and the story, the experimenter pointed to each character whenever he, she, or it was 
mentioned. Then participants were told a story: “One day the [characters] went for a walk in the 
woods. While they were walking they met a wizard [the experimenter showed a picture of a 
wizard].” In the trait condition, participants were then told about the magical transfer of the 
identity of the target to the body of the third character (e.g., “The wizard said ‘abracadabra’ and 
put the smart girl into the dog’s body. Now the smart girl is in the dog’s body”). Finally, 
participants were told that the friend was a witness to the transfer (“Millie/the friend saw 
everything that happened”).  
At the end of each vignette, child participants were first presented with comprehension 
check questions (same as in Study 1b) to ensure they understood the story. Incorrect responses 
were corrected. There were 10 instances in which four-year-old participants were corrected, 
receiving a repetition of the story. In each of these instances children indicated that they 
understood the correction by correctly responding to the repeated comprehension questions and 
their data was included in the analyses. Participants were presented with a total of five test 
questions: one identity question, three subjective identity questions, three physical identity 
questions, and two irreplaceable value questions (see Appendix B). The identity question always 
was presented first and the rest of the questions were presented in a random order. The identity 
question requested participants to indicate the location of the target individual after the 
transformation. The three subjective questions make reference to the three pieces of subjective 
information included in the story. In both the proper name and trait label conditions, one of the 
subjective questions was related to a trait (social: “nice”, intellectual: “smart”, and preference: 
“loves ice-cream). These traits match the trait labels used in the trait label condition. The 
physical identity questions referred to the physical aspects of the target, including appearance 
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and the one physical characteristic mentioned in the story. The irreplaceable value questions 
involved a forced choice of which entity should be left behind and which individual the friend 
really wanted to be with. Child participants indicated their responses by pointing to the pictures 
of the characters. After participants responded to each question, they were asked for an 
explanation of their response.  
Adult participants received the stories and questions in a questionnaire format. 
4.2    RESULTS 
Since the distribution was bimodal and therefore not suitable for ANOVA, the data for Identity, 
Subjective Identity, Physical Identity, and Irreplaceable Value were analyzed using a Repeated 
Measures Poisson Regression using Generalized Estimating Equation (Liang & Zegler, 1986). 
4.2.1    Tracking Identity 
Responses to the identity question were analyzed separately from the responses to the subjective 
questions, to determine whether participants viewed the identity of the target, as marked by name 
as having been transferred to the recipient. Given the results of Study 1b, it was expected that 
responses to the identity question would not depend on label type, but that younger children 
would select the recipient as bearer of the label less often than older children and adults. 
Answers to the identity question, “Where is [name of character] now?,” were coded as to 
whether participants pointed to the recipient of the transfer (1), or to one of the other characters 
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(0). In order to examine the effect of ontological category, participants’ responses to the identity 
question were analyzed in terms of individual story. 
To examine the effects of the independent variables on responses to the identity question, 
an initial Repeated Measures Poisson Regression using Generalized Estimating Equation was 
performed on subjective identity scores with sex (male, female), age group (younger, older, 
adult), label type (proper name, trait), as between-subjects predictor variables and category 
(person, dog, stone) as a within-subjects predictor variable. All assumptions were met. There 
were no significant effects of sex. Subsequently, a Repeated Measures Poisson Regression using 
Generalized Estimating Equation was performed on subjective identity scores with age group 
(younger, older, adult), label condition (proper name, trait), as between-subjects predictor 
variables and category (person, dog, stone) as a within-subjects predictor variable. All 
assumptions were met.  
The analyses revealed effects of age group, label type, and category on participants’ 
responses to the identity question. With age, participants increasingly selected the transfer 
recipient as the location of the target character’s name post transfer, χ2 (2) = 11.18, p = .004. 
Pairwise comparisons revealed that younger children (M = .85, SE = .043) were less likely to 
transfer identity than were both older children (M = .98, SE = .021) and adults who were at 
ceiling performance (M = 1.00, SE = 0).  
Overall, participants in the proper name condition (M = .99, SE = .0071) selected the 
transfer recipient more often than those in the trait label condition (M = .89, SE = .032) and this 
difference was significant, χ2 (1) = 8.63, p = .003. In addition, the effect of ontological category 
on responses was significant, χ2 (2) = 6.041, p = .049, with participants selecting the recipient as 
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bearer of the name more often in the stone scenario. Pairwise comparisons revealed that none of 
the contrasts was statistically significant. 
In addition, the age group x label type interaction was significant, χ2 (2) = 8.66, p = .013. 
As shown in Figure 4, children in the younger age group in the proper name condition more 
often selected the recipient as bearing the name than those in the trait label condition. Pairwise 
comparisons indicated that there were no significant differences between age groups for 
participants in the proper name condition. Younger children in the trait label condition (M = .74, 
SE = .073) were less likely to judge that the post-transfer individual was the bearer of the trait 
label than were older children (M = .96, SE = .041) and adults whose performance was at ceiling 
(M = 1.00, SE = 0), χ2 (2) = 13.72, p = .001. The responses of the older children did not differ 
significantly from those of the adults. 
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Figure 4. Mean scores for identity by age group and label type. 
 
 
The label type x category interaction was also significant, χ2 (2) = 11.77, p = .004. 
Participants in the proper name condition selected the recipient more often as the bearer of the 
label than those in the trait label condition, regardless of ontological category. In contrast, 
participants in the trait label condition responded that identity had been transferred more often 
when the transfer recipient was a stone than when it was a person or a dog (see Figure 5). 
Pairwise comparisons indicated that within the trait label condition, participants more often 
transferred identity for stone (M = .98, SE = .021) than for both person (M = .86, SE = .052) and 
dog (M = .84, SE = .057), χ2 (2) = 12.025, p = .002. 
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Figure 5. Mean scores for identity by ontological category and label type. 
 
 
Finally, the age group x label type x category interaction was significant, (χ2 (1) = 5.70, p 
= .017). On closer examination, the responses of adults to the identity question were not affected 
by either label type or the category of the recipient. However, the responses of child participants 
in the trait label condition were dependent on the ontological category of the recipient. More 
specifically, younger children in the trait label condition were less likely than younger children 
in the proper name condition to select the recipient as bearer of the name when that recipient was 
either another person (M = .69, SE = .12) or a dog (M = .63, SE = .12). 
Since the adults performed at ceiling, the performance of the child groups was analyzed 
separately. To examine the effects of the independent variables on responses to the identity 
question for the child groups only, an initial Repeated Measures Poisson Regression using 
Generalized Estimating Equation was performed on subjective identity scores with sex (male, 
female), age group (younger, older), label type (proper name, trait), as between-subjects 
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predictor variables and category (person, dog, stone) as a within-subjects predictor variable. All 
assumptions were met. There were no significant effects of sex. Subsequently, a Repeated 
Measures Poisson Regression using Generalized Estimating Equation was performed on 
subjective identity scores with age group (younger, older), label type (proper name, trait), as 
between-subjects predictor variables and category (person, dog, stone) as a within-subjects 
predictor variable. All assumptions were met.  
The analyses revealed effects of age group, label type, and category on participants’ 
responses to the identity question. With age, participants increasingly selected the transfer 
recipient as the location of the target character’s name post transfer, χ2 (1) = 6.50, p = .011. 
Younger children (M = .85, SE = .043) were less likely to transfer identity than were older 
children (M = .98, SE = .021). 
The effect of label type was also significant, with participants in the proper name 
condition (M = .99, SE = .0071) selecting the transfer recipient more often than those in the trait 
label condition (M = .89, SE = .032) and this difference was significant, χ2 (1) = 8.63, p = .003. 
In addition, the effect of ontological category on responses was significant, χ2 (2) = 6.041, p = 
.049, with participants selecting the recipient as bearer of the name more often in the stone 
scenario. Pairwise comparisons indicated that none of the comparisons between different 
categories was significant. 
In addition, the age group x label type interaction was significant, χ2 (1) = 4.66, p = .031. 
Children in the younger age group in the proper name condition more often selected the recipient 
as bearing the name than those in the trait label condition. Younger children in the trait label 
condition (M = .74, SE = .073) were less likely to judge that the post-transfer individual was the 
bearer of the trait label than were older children (M = .96, SE = .041). 
 96 
The label type x category interaction was also significant, χ2 (2) = 11.18, p = .004. 
Overall, participants in the proper name condition selected the recipient more often as the bearer 
of the label than those in the trait label condition, especially for scenarios in which the transfer 
recipient was another person or a dog. Pairwise comparisons revealed that in the trait label 
condition responses to stone (M = .97, SE = .031) differed significantly from responses to both 
person (M = .80, SE = .072) and dog (M = .77, SE = .078), χ2 (2) = 12.84, p = .002. In the trait 
label condition, participants more often responded that identity was transferred when the 
recipient was a stone than when it was either a person or a dog. 
Finally, the age group x label type x category interaction was significant, (χ2 (1) = 5.70, p 
= .017). Child participants, in the trait label condition, especially those in the younger age group, 
were more affected by category of the recipient. Younger children in the trait label condition 
were less likely to select the recipient as bearer of the name when that recipient was either 
another person (M = .69, SE = .12) or a dog (M = .63, SE = .12), compared to younger children in 
the proper name condition who chose the recipient at ceiling for those two categories. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that in the trait label condition, younger children were less likely than 
older children to transfer identity from the target to a dog, χ2 (1) = 5.33, p = .021. 
4.2.2    Tracking Subjective Identity 
Responses to the subjective questions were examined by creating subjective identity scores to 
test the hypothesis that a proper name in contrast to a trait label can serve as a vehicle for 
mentalistic subjective identity. Given the results of Study 1b, it was predicted that participants’ 
responses to the subjective questions would depend on the age of the participant and the category 
of the transfer recipient. The subjective identity scores were created by coding participants’ 
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responses in terms of whether subjective identity was considered to have changed location as a 
result of the magical transfer. Responses in which participants selected the recipient, indicating 
that the target individual’s identity was construed as having been transferred to the other 
individual, received a score of ‘1’. All other responses received a score of ‘0’. The variable, 
subjective identity was created by summing scores for the three subjective identity questions, 
resulting in scores with a possible range of 0-3. Responses to the identity question were not 
included in the subjective identity score. 
To examine the effects of the independent variables on responses to the subjective 
identity questions, an initial Repeated Measures Poisson Regression using Generalized 
Estimating Equation was performed on subjective identity scores with sex (male, female), age 
group (younger, older, adult), label type (proper name, trait), as between-subjects predictor 
variables and category (person, dog, stone) as a within-subjects predictor variable. All 
assumptions were met. There were no significant effects of sex. Subsequently, a Repeated 
Measures Poisson Regression using Generalized Estimating Equation was performed on 
subjective identity scores with age group (younger, older, adult), label type (proper name, trait), 
as between-subjects predictor variables and category (person, dog, stone) as a within-subjects 
predictor variable. All assumptions were met.  
There was a significant prediction of subjective identity by age group (χ2 (2) = 30.28, p< 
.001). Subjective identity scores increased with age. Pairwise comparisons revealed significant 
differences between younger (M = .43, SE = .13) and older children (M = 1.55, SE = .23), 
between younger children and adults (M = 2.24, SE = .14), and between older children and 
adults. With age, participants increasingly responded that subjective identity was transferred 
from the target character to the body of the recipient. However, in contrast to predictions, neither 
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label type nor ontological category significantly predicted responses to the subjective identity 
questions. 
To examine the effects of the independent variables on the responses of the child groups 
only to the subjective identity questions, an initial Repeated Measures Poisson Regression using 
Generalized Estimating Equation was performed on subjective identity scores with sex (male, 
female), age group (younger, older), label type (proper name, trait), as between-subjects 
predictor variables and category (person, dog, stone) as a within-subjects predictor variable. All 
assumptions were met. There were no significant effects of sex. Subsequently, a Repeated 
Measures Poisson Regression using Generalized Estimating Equation was performed on 
subjective identity scores with age group (younger, older, adult), label type (proper name, trait), 
as between-subjects predictor variables and category (person, dog, stone) as a within-subjects 
predictor variable. All assumptions were met.  
There was a significant prediction of subjective identity by age group (χ2 (1) = 13.81, p < 
.001). Subjective identity scores increased with age. Younger children (M = .43, SE = .13) were 
less likely than older children (M = 1.55, SE = .23), to transfer the subjective identity of the 
target character to the post-transfer individual. However, in contrast to predictions, neither label 
type nor ontological category significantly predicted responses to the subjective identity 
questions. 
 Explanations for the subjective identity questions were examined concerning whether 
participants referred to the transfer or to other story descriptions. The goal of the explanation 
analysis was to determine whether participants made their selections due to an understanding of 
transferred subjective identity, because of a focus on the appearance of characters and statements 
in the story, or for other reasons. Explanations were categorized as “transfer” if participants 
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mentioned the transfer in the story (e.g., the wizard changed them”). Responses were categorized 
as “story” if participants appealed to the story or repeated descriptions from the story (e.g., “it 
said so in the story,” “because she was the one who lost her sweater”). Explanations that did not 
fit into either of those categories, as well as “I don’t know” responses, were labeled as “other.” 
Justifications were independently coded by the experimenter and a second coder who was 
unaware of the hypotheses of the study. Inter-rater reliability was 98.78% and disagreements 
were resolved through discussion. Overall, references to the transfer occurred more often in the 
older and adult age groups than in the younger age group (See Table 11). 
 
 
 
Table 11. Percentages of explanations for subjective identity questions by age group and justification 
category. 
 
 Transfer Story Other 
Younger 22.92% 38.54%  38.54% 
Older 52.94% 28.76% 18.30% 
Adult 67.46% 20.63%             11.90% 
 
4.2.3    Tracking Physical Identity 
The transfer scenario was designed to distinguish the physical body from subjective identity, 
thus, physical identity questions were included in Study 2 to make sure that participants 
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differentiated between the two. The goal of the physical identity questions was to determine 
whether participants judged physical identity to stay with the body of the target or to have moved 
to the body of the transfer recipient. It was hypothesized that regardless of age, label condition, 
and category of recipient, participants would select the body of the target as bearing physical 
markers. Thus, responses that included the target character, indicating that the physical identity 
of the target was judged as remaining with his or her body, received a score of ‘1.’ All other 
responses received a score of ‘0.’ The variable, physical identity, was created by summing scores 
for the physical identity questions, with possible values ranging from 0-3.  
To analyze the effects of the independent variables on responses to the physical identity 
questions, an initial Repeated Measures Poisson Regression using Generalized Estimating 
Equation was performed on physical identity with sex (male, female), age group (younger, older, 
adult), label type (proper name, trait label), as between-subjects predictor variables and category 
(person, dog, stone) as a within-subjects predictor variable. All assumptions were met. There 
were no significant effects of sex on physical identity responses. Subsequently, a Repeated 
Measures Poisson Regression using Generalized Estimating Equation was performed on physical 
identity with age group (younger, older, adult), label type (proper name, trait label), as between-
subjects predictor variables and category (person, dog, stone) as a within-subjects predictor 
variable. All assumptions were met. 
There was a significant prediction of physical identity by age group (χ2 (2), p < .001). 
Younger children (M = 2.33, SE = .17) and adults (M = 2.46, SE = .13) displayed similar levels 
of continuity whereas older children had scores (M = 1.36, SE = .23) that were significantly 
lower than both younger children and adults as revealed in pairwise comparisons. Both younger 
children and adults judged that physical characteristics remain with the body of the target 
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individual. However, older children were more likely to judge that physical characteristics of the 
target ended up with the recipient, post transfer. This result suggests that older children, in 
contrast to predictions, were less likely than participants in the other two age groups, to 
distinguish the physical body from subjective identity in the magical transfer scenarios. 
To analyze the effects of the independent variables on the responses of the child groups 
only to the physical identity questions, an initial Repeated Measures Poisson Regression using 
Generalized Estimating Equation was performed on physical identity with sex (male, female), 
age group (younger, older), label type (proper name, trait label), as between-subjects predictor 
variables and category (person, dog, stone) as a within-subjects predictor variable. All 
assumptions were met. There were no significant effects of sex on physical identity responses. 
Subsequently, a Repeated Measures Poisson Regression using Generalized Estimating Equation 
was performed on physical identity with age group (younger, older, adult), label type (proper 
name, trait label), as between-subjects predictor variables and category (person, dog, stone) as a 
within-subjects predictor variable. All assumptions were met. 
There was a significant prediction of physical identity by age group (χ2 (1) = 8.39, p = 
.004). Younger children (M = 2.33, SE = .17) were more likely than older children (M = 1.36, SE 
= .23) to judge that physical characteristics remain with the body of the target individual. 
However, older children were more likely to judge that physical characteristics of the target 
ended up with the recipient, post transfer. This result suggests that older children, in contrast to 
predictions, were less likely than younger children, to distinguish the physical body from 
subjective identity in the magical transfer scenarios. 
Explanations for the physical identity questions were examined to determine whether 
participants justified their responses in terms of the transfer, physical appearance of the character 
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and statements from the story, or for some other reason. It was expected that the most common 
explanations for physical identity questions would involve references to the character’s 
appearance or to statements in the story. Explanations for the physical identity questions were 
coded according to whether the ‘transfer’ was mentioned (e.g., “because the wizard put her into 
the stone”), whether appearance or the ‘story’ (e.g., “it said so in the story that her knee was 
scraped,” “in the picture”) was highlighted, or ‘other.’ Justifications were independently coded 
by the experimenter and a second coder who was unaware of the hypotheses of the study. Inter-
rater reliability was 96.74% and disagreements were resolved through discussion. Younger 
children and adults justified their answers by pointing to aspects of the story or to the pictures 
(e.g., “because it said so in the story”) and the appearance of the character more often than the 
transfer, whereas older children predominantly mentioned the transfer (see Table 12). 
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Table 12. Percentages of explanations for physical identity questions by age group and justification 
category. 
 
 
 Transfer Story Other 
Younger 25.69%  40.97% 33.33% 
Older 50.00% 31.22% 10.78% 
Adult 19.58% 79.10% 1.32% 
 
 
 
4.2.4    Judgments of Irreplacable Value 
The two value questions were primarily asked to examine whether label condition and category 
influence judgments of the irreplaceable value of the target character’s subjective identity. The 
idea behind these questions was that if the a proper name highlights irreplaceable value, and if 
the identity to which that proper name refers gets transferred to a different body, then that body, 
the body of the recipient, would be selected as more valuable than the other choices. For the first 
irreplaceable value question (“Who should the Friend leave behind in the woods?”), the correct 
response was considered any response that did not include the recipient of the target’s subjective 
identity, indicating that the friend would not want to leave his or her friend’s subjective identity 
in the woods.  Responses to this question that did not include the recipient received a ‘1. 
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’Responses that included the recipient received a ‘0.’ For the second irreplaceable value question 
(“Which one does the Friend really want with him/her?”), the correct response was considered to 
involve selection of the recipient of subjective identity. Responses to this question that included 
the recipient received a ‘1’ and all other responses received a ‘0.’ An irreplaceable value score 
was created by summing the scores for the two value questions, with possible values ranging 
from 0-2. 
To analyze the effects of the independent variables on responses to the value questions, a 
Repeated Measures Poisson Regression using Generalized Estimating Equation was performed 
on irreplaceable value scores with sex, (male, female), age group (younger, older, adult), label 
type (proper name, trait label), as between-subjects predictor variables and category (person, 
dog, stone) as a within-subjects predictor variable. All assumptions were met.  
There was a significant prediction of irreplaceable value by age group (χ2 (2) = 39.01, p< 
.001). Younger (M = .63, SE = .081) and older children (M = .72, SE = .11) did not differ 
significantly from each other. Both younger and older groups differed significantly from adults 
(M = 1.39, SE = .097) with adults demonstrating higher irreplaceable value scores, as revealed in 
pairwise comparisons. This result indicates that adults were more likely than child participants to 
both successfully track subjective identity across the transfer and to judge that subjective identity 
as more irreplaceable to a friend. 
There was a significant prediction of value by sex (χ2 (1) = 3.99, p = .046). Overall, 
males had higher value scores (M = .96, SE = .077) than females (M = .73, SE = .084). The sex X 
age group interaction was significant (χ2 (2) = 12.03, p = .003). Males had higher value scores 
than females, and the scores of both males and females were higher among the older age groups. 
However, pairwise comparisons revealed that the age difference was only significant for females. 
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Adult female participants demonstrated significantly higher irreplaceable value scores (M = 1.58, 
SE = .13) than those in the younger age groups (older: M = .56, SE = .14; younger: M = .45, SE = 
.094), whereas age did not influence the irreplaceable value scores of male participants. In 
addition, paiwise comparisons revealed that the sex difference in irreplaceable value judgments 
was only significant for children in the youngest age group, with younger males demonstrating 
higher irreplaceable value scores (M = .82, SE = .11) than younger females (M = .45, SE = .094). 
These results indicate that in the youngest age group, male participants more often than female 
participants chose the recipient of the transfer as more irreplaceable than the other characters. In 
addition, with age, both male and female participants, more often chose the transfer recipient as 
more irreplaceable. 
To analyze the effects of the independent variables on the responses of the child groups 
only to the value questions, a Repeated Measures Poisson Regression using Generalized 
Estimating Equation was performed on irreplaceable value scores with sex, (male, female), age 
group (younger, older), label type (proper name, trait label), as between-subjects predictor 
variables and category (person, dog, stone) as a within-subjects predictor variable. All 
assumptions were met. None of the effects were significant. 
Explanations for the irreplaceable value questions were coded according to whether or 
not the transfer was mentioned. Justifications were independently coded by the experimenter and 
a second coder who was unaware of the hypotheses of the study. Inter-rater reliability was 99.1% 
and disagreements were resolved through discussion. Adults mentioned the transfer in their 
explanations of their responses to the value questions more often than both younger and older 
children (See Table 13). Despite the sex differences observed in responses to the value 
judgments, there were no sex differences in the explanations of those responses. 
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Table 13. Percentages of explanations for irreplaceable value questions by age group and 
justification category. 
 
 Mention Transfer No Mention 
Younger 9.90% 90.10% 
Older 29.90% 70.10% 
Adult 67.46% 32.54% 
 
 
 
4.2.5    Response Patterns 
To examine individual response patterns across question types, a new variable of response 
pattern was created. Participants were coded as to whether or not they understood subjective 
identity (transferred), physical identity (not transferred), and irreplaceable value. Understanding 
of subjective identity was marked by a participant’s responding that subjective identity was 
transferred on at least two of the three subjective identity questions; participants who transferred 
subjective identity on less than two questions were coded as not understanding subjective 
identity. Similarly, understanding of physical identity was marked by responding that physical 
identity was not transferred on at least two of the three physical identity questions. And 
 107 
understanding irreplaceable value was marked by responding that subjective identity was valued 
on at least two of the three irreplaceable questions. 
An initial analysis was conducted to examine the response patterns by age group. 
Participants’ responses were placed into four categories: understanding of all three (subjective 
identity, physical identity, and irreplaceable value), understanding of only subjective identity and 
physical identity, understanding of only subjective identity and irreplaceable value, and other. 
These response categories were selected to observe the number of participants who understood 
all three question types, those who understood subjective and physical identity as separate 
although who did not understand irreplaceable value, those who linked subjective identity and 
irreplaceable value without regarding physical identity as separate, and all other categories of 
response. A chi-square analysis on age group and category of response type was significant, χ2 
(6) = 1.69E2, p < .001. Adults tended to understand both subjective and physical identity as well 
as irreplaceable value, whereas child participants did not (see Table 14). Some of the older 
children did demonstrate a response pattern indicating they understood both subjective identity 
and irreplaceable value, although not physical identity (see Table 14). 
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Table 14. Category of response pattern by age group. 
 
 
 Category of Response Pattern 
Age Understand 
all 3 
Subjective 
and Physical 
ID only 
Subjective ID 
and Value 
Only 
Other Total 
Younger 1 0 5 90 96 
Older 6 2 32 62 102 
Adult 77 3 19 30 129 
Total 84 5 56 182 327 
 
 
 
Subsequent analyses focused on participants’ performance on pairs of questions types: 
subjective identity and irreplaceable value, subjective identity and physical identity, and physical 
identity and irreplaceable value. Given that understanding of irreplaceable value as formulated in 
Study 2, is dependent on understanding of subjective identity, it was expected that performance 
on irreplaceable value questions would be related to performance on subjective identity 
questions. To examine whether participants who understood subjective identity also tended 
understand irreplaceable value, the data was collapsed across age and analyzed by chi-square 
analysis. A chi-square analysis examining performance across subjective identity and 
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irreplaceable value questions confirmed a relationship between understanding subjective identity 
and inferring the irreplaceable value of such identity, χ2 (1) = 3.66E1, p < .001 (see Table 15). 
 
 
 
Table 15.  Response patterns across subjective identity and irreplaceable value questions. 
 
 Understand Subjective Identity 
Understand 
Irreplaceable Value 
Yes No Total 
Yes 77 30 107 
No 80 140 220 
Total 157 170 327 
 
 
 
However, when the same chi-square analysis was run with the child groups only, the 
result was not significant, χ2 (1) = 3.02, p = .082. More children did not transfer subjective 
identity than did, and were split as to whether they judged the post-transfer recipient as 
irreplaceably valuable. 
According to the idea of intuitive dualism, subjective identity is separate from the 
material body, thus it was expected that participants who understood subjective identity as 
transferrable in the magical transfer scenario would also judge physical identity as non-
transferrable. A chi-square analysis examining performance across subjective identity and 
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physical questions indicated that the majority of participants who understood physical identity 
did not understand subjective identity, χ2 (1) = 5.94E1, p < .001. Of the participants who did 
transfer subjective identity, roughly half also mistakenly transferred physical identity (see Table 
16). This result was likely driven by the performance of the child groups. A chi-square analysis 
examining performance across subjective and physical identity questions with child groups only 
was also significant, indicating that the majority of children appeared to understood that physical 
identity was not transferred but were less willing to transfer subjective identity to the recipient, 
as seen in Table 17, χ2 (1) = 1.15E2, p < .001. 
 
 
 
Table 16.  Responses across subjective and physical identity questions, collapsed across age groups. 
 
 Understand Physical Identity 
Understand 
Subjective identity 
Yes No Total 
Yes 89 81 170 
No 143 14 157 
Total 232 95 327 
 
 
 
 
 
 111 
Table 17.  Responses of child groups only across subjective and physical identity questions. 
 
 Understand Physical Identity 
Understand 
Subjective Identity 
Yes No Total 
Yes 9 61 70 
No 115 13 128 
Total 124 74 198 
 
 
 
Since the irreplaceable value questions were dependent on understanding of subjective 
identity, it was expected that participants who understood irreplaceable value would also judge 
physical identity as non-transferrable. A chi-square analysis of the relation between performance 
on the physical identity and irreplaceable value questions was not significant, χ2 (1) = 1.87, p < 
.17. Participants who demonstrated an understanding of irreplaceable value were not 
significantly more likely to also understand physical identity.  
4.3    DISCUSSION 
Study 2 examined the ability of children and adults to use proper names versus trait labels to 
track subjective identity across magical transfers differing in degree of ontological distance from 
the target individual. As predicted, younger children in the proper name condition were better 
able to track the identity of the target character than those in the trait label condition. In addition, 
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as predicted, age group was also a significant predictor of subjective identity scores. With 
increasing age, participants more often identified the transfer recipient as the host of the target 
character’s subjective identity. This result was similar to the pattern observed in Study1b, as well 
as the results found in other research on identity (Corriveau et al., 2005; Johnson, 1990). In 
Study 2, as in those studies, 7-year-old children demonstrated a better understanding of 
subjective identity as compared to 4-year-old children. The older the participant, the better they 
were at tracking individual identity regardless of whether a proper name or a category label is 
used to mark the individual. Taken together, the results suggest that although children are able to 
track identity using labels, they are better able to do so with proper names than with trait labels, 
and this ability to track identity does not entail an understanding that subjective identity is 
connected to the identity to which a proper name refers. However, by 7 years of age, children 
demonstrate an understanding that name and subjective identity go together.  
Although the results of Study 2 suggest that label type influenced younger children’s 
responses to the identity question, whether the transfer involved a proper name or a trait label did 
not appear to affect responses to subjective identity questions. Previous research has suggested 
that descriptions are psychologically different from proper names (Garcia-Ramirez & Shatz, 
2011), however, the results of Study 2 do not support a distinction between proper name and trait 
label in terms of use in tracking subjective identity across a magical transfer. Label type did not 
influence subjective identity scores, suggesting that descriptive labels can serve a similar 
function to a proper name at least in a restricted context such as the vignettes in Study 2. 
Although trait labels can serve the function of proper names in a limited context, other contexts, 
such as an extended narrative, may serve to highlight the distinction between the two.  
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Study 2 also set out to examine the effect of the ontological category of the transfer 
recipient on identity tracking. Responses to the identity question were affected by the ontological 
category of the transfer recipient. Participants in the trait label condition were less likely than 
participants in the proper name condition to select the transfer recipient as the bearer of the label, 
especially for the person-to-person and person-to-dog transfers. However, there was no 
difference between participants in both label type conditions in their responses for the person-to-
stone transfer. The results of Study 2 demonstrating that identity was more often viewed as 
having been transferred for stone more than person or dog, contrast with the findings of 
Rhemtulla and Hall (2009) that adults’ judgments of the persistence of individual identity drop 
off when transformations occur across ontological boundaries. In Study 2, for participants in the 
trait label condition, the stone appeared to serve as better recipient of identity than person or dog. 
Perhaps this finding is due to the stone’s lack of a competing trait-relevant identity. A stone does 
not possess traits such as being nice or loving ice cream, although a person or a dog potentially 
does possess such traits. If this were the case, it would be expected that ontological category 
would likewise influence participants’ responses to the subjective identity questions. However, 
ontological category did not emerge as a significant predictor of subjective identity scores.  
Study 2 also included physical identity questions to determine whether participants would 
distinguish between physical identity and subjective identity in a transfer scenario. The results 
indicated that age group significantly predicted responses to the physical identity questions. The 
responses of adults and younger children to the physical identity questions did not differ 
significantly from each other. However, both groups differed significantly from the older 
children who had lower physical identity scores. It is possible that the older children were 
interpreting the transfer in a different way than participants in the other two age groups. That is, 
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older children may have been relying on a model of transfer that involved incorporation of the 
two bodies. The explanation data shed light on this. Of the explanations older children provided 
for their responses to the physical identity questions, 50% referred to the transfer, a much higher 
percentage than found among participants in the other two age groups. These references to the 
transfer suggest that some older children interpreted that the body of the target character was 
transferred along with subjective identity. For example, a few children suggested that the target, 
body and all, was inside the recipient: “The girl’s toe is stubbed, but the girl is inside the rock”; 
“because [target] was wearing the dress and now she is inside the other girl.” In addition, during 
a number of the interviews, especially with older children, participants placed the picture of the 
target on top of the picture of the transfer recipient. Thus, on average, more children in the older 
age group than younger children or adults, appeared to have interpreted the ambiguous transfer 
scenario as the merging of two bodies, or the incorporation of one body into another, than as the 
transfer of subjective identity only. 
Another major objective of Study 2 was to explore the influence of age, label, and 
ontological category on irreplaceable value judgments. Results indicated that the age of 
participants did influence their irreplaceable value scores. Adults demonstrated higher 
irreplaceable value scores than both younger and older children. The explanations for the 
responses to the irreplaceable value questions indicate that there was an increase in mentioning 
the transfer with age. Thus, as participants increasingly understand the transfer of subject 
identity, judgments of irreplaceable value follow along with that. In addition, older children and 
adults used friendship to justify their responses more than did younger children. 
Although sex differences in responses to the irreplaceable value questions were not 
predicted, the analyses revealed that males demonstrated higher irreplaceable value scores than 
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females. In addition, there was a significant age group by sex interaction, with the age difference 
in irreplaceable value scores greater for females than for males. Adult female participants 
demonstrated significantly higher irreplaceable value scores than those in the younger age 
groups, whereas age did not influence the irreplaceable value scores of male participants. In 
addition, the sex difference for irreplaceable value was only significant among the youngest age 
group. The male and female participants in the younger age group may have been focusing on 
different aspects of the individual in making their judgments, however no difference was 
observed in the explanation data in Study 2.  
Neither label type nor ontological category had an effect on irreplaceable value scores. 
Whether a character was referred to with a proper name instead of a trait label, did not have any 
significant effect on judgments about the irreplaceable value of the target individual. In addition, 
the ontological category of the transfer recipient did not influence participants’ judgments of 
irreplaceable value. However, analyses of response patterns of participants across subjective 
identity and irreplaceable value questions indicated that the majority of participants who 
interpreted subjective identity as having been transferred from target to recipient, also judged 
that subjective identity as irreplaceably valuable. 
 116 
5.0    GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present research set out to examine the development of the understanding of two functions 
of proper names: a) the tracking of individual identity and b) the highlighting of the irreplaceable 
value of an individual. Study 1a investigated children’s ability to use proper names to track toys 
as well as the influence on value judgments of proper names in contrast to other labels. Study 1b 
compared participants’ use of proper name and mind as vehicles for subjective identity in 
magical transfer scenarios. Building on Study 1b, Study 2 also employed magical transfer 
scenarios to examine the use of proper name in comparison to trait label as a vehicle for 
subjective identity. In addition, both Studies 1b and 2 examined the effect of the category of the 
transfer recipient on both subjective identity tracking and value judgments. Furthermore, the 
studies also examined the effect of identity vehicle (mind, proper name, trait label) on judgments 
of value. 
5.1    SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS 
5.1.1    Proper Names and Tracking Identity 
In Study 1a, children were presented with a toy labeled with a proper name and were required to 
track the toy across changes in location and distinguish it from an identical toy. Previous 
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research has demonstrated that even young children are able to track named toys in similar 
circumstances, thus it was expected that even the youngest children would be able to track the 
toy labeled with a proper name and distinguish it from the toy identical in appearance, but not in 
label (Sorrentino, 2001). In Study 1a, children were able to distinguish and track a named toy as 
distinct from an identical toy referred to by a category label. However, the results indicate that 
the ability to track the named toy was dependent on age. Whereas the majority of the older 
children were able to use a proper name to track the identity of a toy, the performance of younger 
children did not differ from chance. In addition, children were more successful at answering the 
second identity question (“Where is [named toy] now?”).The action immediately preceding this 
question (throwing away the named toy) may have directed children’s attention to the location of 
the named toy, resulting in an increase in correct responses.  However, the performance of the 
younger children also suggests that the ability to use proper names to track a toy across chances 
in location and when presented with an identical unnamed toy, is still developing. In other 
contexts children younger than four years of age are able to successfully track a named toy. In 
the present study, the task presented to children was more demanding since it required children 
to both keep track of a toy across changes in location even when out of sight and distinguish it 
from an identical toy. In addition, children were not invited to play with the toy and the toy was 
not an attachment object, therefore young children might have been less motivated to keep track 
of the toy. Research by Hood and Bloom (2008) has shown that in a task in which children are 
asked to hand over an attachment object to be duplicated in a special copier box, children are 
highly motivated to track and distinguish their attachment object from an exact duplicate. 
However, in that research whether or not those attachment objects were named was not 
addressed. 
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Category membership has been shown to be important for whether an entity gets a name 
and for the basis of identity (Corriveau et al., 2005; Hall et al., 2004; Johnson, 1990; Rhemtulla 
& Hall, 2009). In the present studies, the category of the named individual was also varied to 
examine the influence on identity tracking. In Study 1a, children were presented with an animate 
surrogate, a stuffed elephant, or an inanimate, a toy car. No effect of toy type was found on 
children’s tracking of the identity of the toys. Although toy type was not found to be significant 
overall, it is possible that the younger children’s lower scores in tracking identity could have 
been influenced by interpreting the proper name as a category label for the toy car. In research 
with novel labels, children have been shown to interpret these labels as category labels rather 
than proper names for toys that do not bear any characteristics of animacy (Gelman & Taylor, 
1984). Several of the children’s spontaneous comments suggested that they might have 
interpreted the proper name for the car as a category label. For example, when presented with the 
second toy car, one child asked, “Is that another Lyle?” In contrast, when presented with the 
second stuffed elephant, one child asked, “What is its name?” perhaps implying that the second 
toy elephant would necessarily possess a name different from the first elephant (Hall, 1996; Hall 
& Belanger, 2005; Hall & Graham, 1999). 
Ontological category also played a role in children’s responses in Studies 1b and 2. In 
Study 1b, children who heard that a person’s mind was transferred to a dog more often judged 
that subjective identity had been transferred than children who heard only the proper name 
transferred to a dog. When the recipient was a person, children’s responses to the subjective 
identity questions were not dependent on the vehicle of identity, with no significant difference 
between proper name and mind. In Study 2, children in the youngest age group in the trait label 
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condition more often judged that identity was transferred in the person-to-stone transfers than in 
either person-to-person or person-to-dog transfers. 
 
5.1.2    Understanding Subjective Identity 
The present research also examined children’s understanding of subjective, mentalistic identity. 
In accordance with the findings of previous research (Corriveau et al., 2005), it was expected that 
the ability to track subjective identity would increase between the ages of four and seven. In 
terms of tracking subjective identity, a shift with age was also observed in both Studies 1b and 2. 
In Study 1b, the four-year-old participants demonstrated lower subjective identity scores than the 
seven-year-olds. This result indicates that regardless of the vehicle of subjective identity 
employed in the stories, four-year-olds were less willing than seven-year-olds to respond that 
aspects of the target character’s subjective identity were transferred to the body of the transfer 
recipient. Similarly, in Study 2, age differences in subjective identity scores were also observed. 
Older children performed significantly better than younger children on the subjective identity 
questions, and adults performed better than older children. With age, participants more often 
responded that the target character’s subjective identity was transferred to the body of the 
transfer recipient. The results of Study 2 suggest that regardless of the label used to refer to the 
target character, identity tracking continues to improve in middle childhood. The results of both 
Studies 1b and 2, concur with the findings of previous research examining identity that also 
observed developmental differences in the understanding of mentalistic subjective identity 
between 4- to 5-year-olds and 7-year-olds (Corriveau et al., 2005; Johnson, 1990). 
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Although it was expected that there would be a general increase in the understanding of 
subjective identity with age, the primary goal of Study 1b was to determine if young children 
would be able to use a proper name as a vehicle for subjective identity before being able to do so 
with mind. Given children’s early understanding of proper names, their ability to use proper 
names to track individuals, and the intuitive distinction between mentalistic agents and non-
agents (intuitive dualism), it was predicted that children in the younger age group would have 
greater success in tracking subjective identity across a magical transfer by using a proper name 
rather than mind as the vehicle of identity. The results of Study 1b indicated that both 4- and 7-
year-old children, when asked about the location of the named character after the transfer, were 
better able to track the identity with proper names than with mind. However, the ability to use a 
proper name to track identity does not entail an understanding of the link between a proper name 
and subjective identity. In contrast to expectations, younger children in Study 1b demonstrated 
greater difficultly than older children in using a proper name in contrast to mind, to track 
individual identity across a transfer. Older children were able to track individual identity equally 
well for both proper name and mind. The results of Study 1b, concur with those of previous 
research (Corriveau et al., 2005; Johnson, 1990) demonstrating a similar developmental change 
in the understanding of subjective identity between the ages of 4 and 7. The results of Study 1b 
further show that in a magical transfer scenario, even 4-year-olds can track identity, although not 
subjective aspects of identity, using a proper name. Thus young children who already have an 
understanding of the link between proper names and identity but do not yet fully grasp subjective 
identity, can use proper names as a vehicle for identity and track that identity in situations like 
the stories in Studies 1b and 2. It is possible that the understanding of subjective identity and 
other forms of immaterial identity, such as soul, build on this foundational understanding of 
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identity. However, the results of Study 1b also imply that measures relying solely on names are 
limited in gauging children’s understanding of subjective identity and other potential concepts of 
immaterial identity. Young children might already have a proto-understanding of immaterial 
identity that becomes elaborated with development. 
Why did younger children have such a difficult time with using a proper name as a 
vehicle for individual subjective identity? Younger children appeared to have an easier time 
understanding mind as a vehicle for mentalistic aspects of identity. Other research has shown 
that young children associate mental stuff with the mind (Corriveau et al, 2005). However, a 
proper name encompasses much more: it refers to the body, the mind, the soul, the person in all 
possible words. The proper name scenarios were ambiguous concerning what exactly the wizard 
transferred from the target character to the recipient. Younger children might have been focused 
on the body and appearances, whereas older children, by 7-8 years of age, were more likely to 
infer that the proper name in that instance served as a vehicle for subjective identity. In the 
proper name condition, many of the older children, as well as some of the younger children, 
spontaneously offered comments that suggested that they interpreted the scenarios as involving a 
transfer of mind, brain, or soul. One seven-year-old justified his answer to a subjective identity 
question by explaining that the characters had “switched souls.” Another explained that the target 
character’s “brain went into the dog’s brain.” 
Alternatively, children might think of mind in more categorical terms and proper names 
in more individual terms. Every person has a mind that functions more or less similarly; just the 
contents tend to vary. However, proper names are individual and refer to individuals (despite 
some people sharing the same proper name). Thus, the difference in performance for mind and 
proper name among younger children may point to importance of categorical understanding for 
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disambiguating a situation like that in the magical transfer stories. A transfer of a mind is easier 
to conceptualize because there are many minds out there. Proper names do not help disambiguate 
the situation because they refer to the individual as complete. How can Sally as an individual get 
transferred? What does it mean when “Sally” (in contrast to “her mind”) gets transferred? To 
what does “Sally” refer? The younger children were not as good at disambiguation, but with age 
they develop a better understanding of underlying traits and characteristics as comprising 
individual identity (Johnson, 1990). 
 Could an underlying trait, one aspect of identity, be used to track subjective identity 
across a magical transfer? The philosophical literature suggests that trait labels and proper names 
serve distinct functions (Garcia-Ramirez & Shatz, 2011; Jeshion, 2009). In Study 2 trait labels 
were contrasted with proper names as potential vehicles for individual subjective identity. In 
terms of tracking identity, when asked to select the location of the labeled target character, 
younger children in the trait label condition chose the transfer recipient less often than those in 
the proper name condition. Thus, at least for 4-year-old participants, proper names promoted 
better tracking of identity than trait labels.  However, in terms of subjective identity, the results 
of Study 2 indicated that participants in all age groups used proper names and trait labels equally 
well to track subjective identity in the transfer scenarios. Although proper names and trait labels 
theoretically serve different functions, in Study 2, participants were able to use both types of 
labels to individuate and track the identity of the labeled character. This result supports Jeshion’s 
(2009) observation that “[d]escriptive names seem to behave in language as bona fide proper 
names” (p. 388). Within the limited context of the stories, participants were able to use trait 
labels, such as “the smart boy,” to track the subjective identity of a character. The results thus 
suggest that other labels can serve a purpose similar to proper names at least in a limited context. 
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However, Jeshion (2009) also maintains that proper names still add something more than mere 
descriptions or descriptive labels. Perhaps within a more complicated context, such as an 
extended narrative, trait labels might falter in their usefulness to track individuals. In a classroom 
full of smart boys, the label of “the smart boy” is not all that useful in helping to track the 
identity of one particular smart boy. 
In Study 2, the tracking of physical identity was also examined to determine whether 
participants would view the transfer as resulting in the separation of the physical and subjective 
aspects of the target character. The results of Study 2 indicated that younger children and adults 
similarly judged the physical aspects of the target character as remaining with the target’s body 
after the transfer. However, the physical identity scores of the older children differed 
significantly from both the younger children and the adults, with the older children displaying 
lower physical identity continuity scores. The older children were more likely that the other two 
age groups to respond that aspects of the target character’s physical identity were transferred to 
the body of the recipient. On closer examination, older children may have interpreted the transfer 
more as incorporation or fusion of two bodies, rather than as the mind of the target going into a 
different body. Older children often mentioned the transfer in their explanations of their 
responses to the physical identity questions. Some of the explanations of the older children hint 
at such an interpretation: “because he is in dog’s stomach,” “because she [the target] was 
wearing the dress and now she is insider her [the other girl].” Although the younger children and 
the adults did not differ significantly in terms of physical identity scores, it is unlikely they were 
interpreting the transfer in the same way. Overall, the younger children appeared to be more 
focused on appearance, leading to higher physical identity continuity scores, and lower 
subjective identity continuity scores. Adults demonstrated a clear understanding of the separation 
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of subjective identity and body, with high scores for both subjective and physical identity. Older 
children displayed a different pattern, with relatively high scores for subjective identity and low 
scores for physical identity.  
In the identity literature, category membership has been shown to be important for 
whether an entity gets a name and for the basis of identity (Corriveau et al., 2005; Hall et al., 
2004; Johnson, 1990; Rhemtulla & Hall, 2009). In addition, research examining value judgments 
has demonstrated that the degree of agency of an entity affects value judgments of that entity. In 
the present studies, the category of the named individual was also varied to examine the 
influence on identity tracking and subjective identity scores.  
In Studies 1b and 2, the category of the transfer recipient was varied to examine the role 
of category in providing a basis for identity, that is, whether continued category membership is 
necessary for identity continuity as proposed by both Macnamara (1982) and Xu (2007).  In 
Study 1b, the category involved in the transfer was found to have a significant effect on 
subjective identity scores.  Overall, participants more often inferred that subjective identity was 
transferred from a person to another person than from a person to a dog. This finding contrasts 
with that of Rhemtulla and Hall (2009) who found that adults judge identity as persisting more 
for cross-basic category than for within-basic category transformations. The finding also 
contrasts with that of Johnson (1990) who found that children were better able to understand the 
transfer of subjective identity in a brain transplant between a child and a pig, than between a 
child and another child. However, the findings of the present research concur with the findings of 
Liittschwager (1995) who observed in four-year-olds, a decrease in persistence of identity 
judgments from changes in appearance to ontological change. In Study 2, despite a similar 
procedure to Study 1b and the addition of an inanimate object as a transfer recipient, the 
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significant effect of ontological category on subjective identity was not replicated.  However, the 
results of Study 2 did include an effect of ontological category on responses to the identity 
question. Children in the youngest age group in the trait label condition more often viewed 
identity as having been transferred in the person-to-stone transfer than in the transfers involving 
another person and a dog. For those children, the stone served as a better recipient for identity 
than either another person or dog. It is possible that a stone that does not possess pre-existing 
traits to compete with those of the incoming identity. Dogs and people can be nice and like ice 
cream, whereas stones do not possess such traits. 
5.1.3    Irreplacable Value and Proper Names 
One of the main objectives of the present studies was to explore the influence of proper names 
on judgments of irreplaceable value. Based on anthropological evidence, it was proposed that a 
proper name confers or highlights irreplaceable value in a way that other kinds of labels do not 
(Vom Bruck & Bodenhorn, 2006). It was expected that individual toys and characters marked 
with proper names, in contrast to trait labels, category labels, and category labels marked with 
possessive pronouns signifying ownership, would be judged as uniquely valuable, and thus less 
replaceable.  Age was not predicted to influence judgments of irreplaceable value. 
In Study 1a, in contrast to the hypothesis, there was evidence that age group predicted 
children’s responses to the open-ended value question and the two questions in the first value 
phase of the task. Younger children were more likely than older children to provide a response of 
“I don’t know”, no response, or some other unclassifiable response, than even to suggest 
replacing the toy. Thus, younger children did not evidence a clear value stance in their answers 
to the open-ended value question. Analysis of the responses to the first set of value questions 
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also revealed an age difference in value judgments of the named toy with younger children were 
more willing than older children to replace the toy. The relation between identity tracking and 
value judgment was not significant, so there is not a clear link between younger children’s 
tracking of identity and their greater willingness to get rid of toys that are old and worn. Age 
difference in irreplaceable value judgments were also found in Study 2, although not in Study 1a. 
In Study 2, adults were more likely than child participants to both successfully track subjective 
identity across the transfer and to judge that subjective identity as more irreplaceable to a friend. 
The results of Study 1a indicated that toy type also predicted children’s responses to 
whether or not the toy was replaceable. More children responded that the toy car was replaceable 
than that the stuffed elephant could be replaced. Since the stuffed elephant was an animate 
surrogate and the toy car lacked features of animacy, this finding is consistent with other 
research that has demonstrated that higher degrees of agency are more valued (Gray et al., 2007).  
Although toy type influenced irreplaceable value judgments, in contrast to expectations, 
when the toy with the proper name was pitted against the identical toy referred to with a label, 
children did not judge the toy with the proper name to have any greater irreplaceable value than 
the other toy. That is, when choosing which toy should be thrown away, children were equally 
likely to choose the toy with the proper name than the one referred to with a category label or 
possessive pronoun.  
Judgments of irreplaceable value were also examined in Studies 1b and 2. It was 
expected that the target character’s subjective identity would be judged as more valuable than his 
or her body. In both of those studies, there were no effects of label, age, or category on the 
irreplaceable value scores. In Study 2, proper name did not appear to confer extra value in 
comparison to a trait label. It is possible that the particular irreplaceable value questions used in 
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Study 2 were not alone sensitive enough to capture the way in which proper names highlight 
and/or confer value on individuals. Other types of questions, similar to those presented by Gray 
and colleagues (2007), such as “which character do you like best?,” “which one would you give 
resources to?,” etc., might offer a clearer picture of value. In addition, some of the participants 
reflected in their explanations of their responses that they did not like the questions because they 
thought it was not right to leave a character behind: “you shouldn’t leave a person in the woods” 
(7-year-old), “These are hard questions because the dog is living. Millie would take both” (7-
year-old), “she shouldn’t leave anyone in the woods” (adult), “none [should get left behind]. 
That’s just mean” (adult). Other participants, especially among the older children, responded that 
it did not make sense because they interpreted the transfer as a bodily incorporation, so there 
really wasn’t anyone the friend could leave behind. In addition, a number of the child 
participants expressed that they did not like the question that required them to choose which 
character the friend would select to be left behind in the woods because they considered such 
behavior to be mean.  These concerns of the child participants highlighted a conflict between 
individual value and fairness inherent in that particular irreplaceable value question. 
5.2     IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE FINDINGS 
The present research set out to examine the foundations of conceptions of subjective identity as 
potentially emerging from proper name understanding as well as the development of children’s 
ability to use proper names to track identity and recognize the connection between proper names 
and irreplaceable value. It was proposed that children might be able to use proper names as a 
vehicle for tracking subjective identity before they are able to do so with mind, given that even 
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young children understand proper names and distinguish them from other kinds of words, infants 
distinguish between agents and non-agents, and that children are more likely to give names to 
animates. However, the results of the present study indicate that although young children more 
successfully track identity using a proper name than mind, they are better able to use mind as a 
vehicle for subjective identity in magical transfer scenarios. The drastic changes depicted in 
Studies 1b and 2 are unusual and do not occur in children’s daily lives, although children would 
be familiar with such changes from fairytales, folktales, and religious stories. For example, 
young children are exposed to stories like the frog prince fairytale and “Sylvester and the Magic 
Pebble” (Steig, 1987) in which magical transformations result in the subjective identities of the 
title characters housed in bodies that differ categorically from their original ones.  Furthermore, 
many cultures demonstrate beliefs in spirit possession in which the subjective identity of a 
person or of a supernatural agent takes over the body of another person (Cohen, 2007). Although 
children may have experience with such stories and phenomena, the stories used in the present 
study also required children to draw on their understanding of magical sorts of events. There are 
plenty of more mundane examples of drastic change that could be presented to children in which 
understanding of magic would not be a prerequisite or a confound. For example, in stories, 
without the aid of pictures, readers are often required to track the subjective identity of a 
character across a narrative in which that character experiences any number of physical and 
psychological changes. In addition, children are also exposed to drastic biological change, such 
as the life cycle of a butterfly. Making the link between proper names and subjective identity is 
important for understanding stories that require keeping track of a character’s subjective identity 
in a narrative. Future research should examine children’s ability to track named individuals 
across more mundane physical, biological, and psychological changes. 
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In addition, in the present research, the transfer scenarios involving proper names (and 
also trait labels) were created to be intentionally ambiguous. The story did not explicitly relate 
what aspect of the target character the wizard transferred to the body of the recipient, although 
the assumption was that subjective identity was what changed from target to recipient. The 
majority of adult participants, and many of the child participants also made this assumption. 
However, there were also a number of unanticipated interpretations of the transfer scenarios, 
especially among the older children. It is possible that in terms of individual identity, children 
draw on certain motor-based schemas (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) that underlie object tracking 
(Bullot & Rysview, 2007) to frame abstract ideas such as those involved in the transfer stories. 
Children may first make sense of mind or identity using these motor-based object schemes. 
There are a number of schemas they can use, such as container (Gottfried et al., 1999). 
Sometimes these schemas allow for success in a task, but at other times they lead to confusion. 
In addition, Cohen and Barrett (2008a; 2008b) have proposed that there are several ways to 
conceptualize spirit possession, such as the fusion of two subjectivities, the displacement of one 
by another, or even an oscillation in which the two spirits fight for control of the body. In 
research by Cohen and Barrett (2008a; 2008b), participants were presented with hypothetical 
spirit possession scenarios in which the mind of one character went into the other character. The 
majority of adult participants in Cohen and Barrett’s (2008a; 2008b) studies demonstrated a 
displacement model of mind possession. 
Although the follow-up questions in Studies 1b and 2, were not geared toward revealing 
the conceptual model underlying participants’ judgments, the explanation data revealed variation 
in participants’ interpretations of the transfer. The explanations children gave to justify their 
responses in Studies 1b and 2 reveal some of these schemas and models. The majority of 
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participants simply mentioned a one-way transfer suggestive of displacement (e.g., “her mind is 
in the other girl,” “Hank is in that rock,” “the fairy got the brain to this brain”), with no mention 
of the possibility of two minds occupying the same body. Some of the participants interpreted the 
transfer as a switch between the target and the recipient: “because he got switched,” “they 
transformed bodies,” “because they switched bodies,” “because the wizard changed their 
bodies,” “because they switched souls,” “because the dog and the girl switched.” Also among 
these interpretations was bodily incorporation of the target character into the body of the 
recipient: “because [the target] is in the dog’s stomach,” “he’s [the target] stuck inside of him 
[recipient],” “because [the target] got the scar in her body and now it is in [recipient’s] body.” 
There was also evidence of mental fusion, with one 7-year-old explaining that “when Cleo goes 
inside then her feelings are inside the dog and the dog’s feelings are also still inside.” Thus, at 
least when an explicit schema for identity, such as mind, is not offered, participants, especially 
children, appear to come up with a variety of interpretations, drawing on a variety of schemas 
and models. Future research should explicitly examine the various schemas children employ in 
subjective identity transfer scenarios, including whether children also prefer a displacement 
model of possession or whether there are developmental changes in conceptualizing transfers of 
subjective identity. 
The results of Studies 1b and 2 support that idea that the intuitive dualism that has been 
argued to underlie conceptions of personhood is more complex than a simple separation of mind 
and body. Research examining conceptions of mind, soul, and, more recently, spirit, suggests 
that conceptions of personhood and personal identity are complex and vary cross-culturally 
(Richert & Harris, 2008; Roazzi, Nyhof, & Johnson, submitted). It has been proposed that proper 
names may promote a kind of psychological essentialism for individuals (Gelman, 2003; Richert 
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& Harris, 2008). The results of the present research suggest that young children do not treat 
proper names as equivalent to minds when it comes to the transfer of individual subjective 
identity. When presented with an ambiguous transfer scenario, young children do not assume, as 
do older children and adults, that proper names refer to a subjective identity. Thus, with age, 
participants did appear link interpret proper names to the mentalistic, subjective aspect of 
individual identity in contrast to bodily identity. Future research should examine how proper 
names function in contrast to mind or soul in afterlife beliefs in contrast to magical 
transformations. To what does a person’s proper name refer once that person has died? The 
body? Or something else like mind or soul? 
The results of the present research also provided evidence that identity does not 
necessarily break down if the category of the individual changes, as suggested by the sortal-first 
view of object identity (Macnamara, 1982; Xu, 2007). However, the view that identity is rooted 
in category membership and that continuity of category membership is necessary for identity to 
be maintained, primarily concerns the identity of objects and bodies. Mentalistic agents are 
different, especially if intuitive dualism is taken into account. If minds and bodies are separable, 
the identity of an agent is not necessarily constrained by a body. As the present studies and prior 
research (Corriveau et al., 2005) have shown, identity construed as thoughts, memories, 
knowledge, and preferences, is viewed as separable from the body. Children and adults are able 
to think about the mind of a person as being transferred and still functioning in the body of a dog 
and even a stone. However, these results do not mean that categories are not important for 
thinking about individual subjective identity. In the present research, younger children were 
better able to understand subjective identity transfer when presented as a transfer of mind than 
when presented as the more ambiguous transfer of proper name. In the more ambiguous transfer 
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scenarios involving proper names and trait labels, older children and adults likely inferred some 
sort of category of vehicle for subjective identity, such as mind, brain, or soul, things that it is 
assumed all agents possess. 
 The present research set out to explore children’s understanding of the connection 
between an object’s having a proper name and its possessing value. In the anthropological 
literature, there is a clear link between names and value. For example, in naming a fetus, parents 
reflect that they already consider it to be a unique, irreplaceable individual, whereas, choosing 
not to name one fetus among several, may make it emotionally easier to terminate that fetus 
(Layne, 2009). However, the results of the studies did not demonstrate an effect of label on 
irreplaceable value judgments. One limitation of Studies 1b and 2, involving the transfer 
scenarios, was that the irreplaceable value of the character with the proper name was not directly 
compared with that of the character bearing other labels. An additional limitation of the studies 
was that the stories and the value questions might not have been sensitive enough to capture the 
way in which proper names highlight and/or confer value on individuals.  
There a number of ways that value might be defined and measured. For example, in 
research examining understanding of authentic objects, value was measured by asking 
participants about the monetary value, desirability of objects, and whether the object deserved to 
be put in a museum (Frazier & Gelman, 2009; Frazier, Gelman, Wilson, & Hood, 2009; Hood & 
Bloom, 2008; Johnson & Jacobs, 2001). However, asking questions to ascertain the value of 
individual agents differs in some ways from asking those questions of authentic objects. 
Although history and relationship contribute to the value of both agents and authentic objects, 
there are also ways in which the valuing of those entities differs. One measure of the value of 
authentic objects is monetary (Frazier et al., 2009). In the past some people may have been 
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valued in terms of monetary worth, but now we would consider such valuation as crass and 
unethical. Ethical considerations were reflected in the explanations of several participants in 
Studies 1b and 2 who stated that they did not like the value question requiring them to choose 
one character to be left behind because they thought it was be mean. Gray et al. (2007) took a 
more positive approach to measuring participants’ value judgments of agents by asking questions 
such as, “which character do you like best?,” “which one would you give resources to?.”  
This distinction in measuring value between objects, authentic and otherwise, and agents 
raises the question of how children view the object-agent distinction when it comes to judging 
value. The way people think about objects and agents is flexible. Adults, in contrast to 5-year-
olds, include more objects in the category of nameable entities (Hall et al., 2004). In addition, 
adults name their cars and talk to their computers. Although adults may treat objects as animate, 
they also have been known to objectify and dehumanize other people. Examples from the 
anthropological literature suggest that proper names can contribute to the validation of the 
individual’s personhood and the denial of a proper name may lead to dehumanization and 
objectification (Scheper-Hughes, 1996). In conversation, a person can make choices concerning 
how to refer to an individual to send a message concerning how that person values that 
individual. For example, as Jeshion (2009) has pointed out, in one of the 2008 presidential 
debates, John McCain referred to Barack Obama as “that one,” and this choice of label was taken 
by many as intended to belittle Obama. Of course, there are other labels that may be used to 
show respect, such as titles and honorifics, or to demean, such as nicknames and name-calling 
(Brewer, 1981; Crozier & Dimmock, 1999). However, proper names uniquely highlight 
individuality. Future research should examine whether children are sensitive to the effect of 
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various labels, especially nicknames, and whether the use of different labels affects how they 
think about agents and objects.  
 The present research indicates that even young children are able to use proper names to 
track identity and that this ability continues to develop with age. The present research contributes 
to identity research by demonstrating that children as young as 4 years of age are able to use 
proper names to track identity, but not subjective, mentalistic identity, across a magical transfer. 
In ambiguous transfer scenarios, children draw on a variety of schemas, not all of which lead to 
success in the task. With increasing age, children come to link labels for individual agents, such 
as proper names and trait labels, with subjective identity. Future research is required to examine 
the variety of ways in which children conceptualize individual immaterial identity, including 
subjective identity, and how these conceptions change with age. Furthermore, although there was 
no conclusive evidence in the present studies that proper names contribute to judgments of 
irreplaceable value, recognition of irreplaceable value appears to increase with age, although the 
connection between proper names and irreplaceable value was only evident in the responses of 
adults. However, several comments by children suggested that they are not insensitive to the 
contributions of names and relationships to the irreplaceable value of toys and agents. Future 
research is required to examine whether and how children distinguish between the value of 
objects and agents, and if proper names play a role in how these entities are perceived. 
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APPENDIX A 
SAMPLE TRANSFER SCENARIOS AND QUESTIONS FROM STUDY 1B 
Paragraph. Sample 1: Person-to- Person Transfer - Mind Condition-Girl     
Pictures of three different people. Pointing to one picture, This is Sally. She likes to 
make lots of friends. Today she is happy because it is her birthday. She knows that in a special 
part of the woods there are yummy berries. Pointing to the other picture This is Sally’s friend 
Juniper.  Pointing to the third picture This is another girl. One day Sally, Juniper and the other 
girl went for a walk in the woods. While they were walking they met a wizard. The wizard said 
“abracadabra” and put her mind in the other girl’s body. Now her mind is in the other girl’s 
body. Juniper saw everything that happened. 
Comprehension Checks:  Which one looks like Sally?  
     Which one is Juniper? 
     What did the wizard do?   
Identity Question: 
Where is Sally now?  
Subjective Questions: 
Which one now feels happy because it is her birthday?   
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Which one now knows where the yummy berries are?  
Which one now likes to make lots of friends?   
Irreplaceable Value Questions: 
Which one should Juniper leave behind in the woods?  
Which one does Juniper really want with her? 
 
 
Sample 2: Person –to-Dog Transfer – Proper Name Condition-Boy      
Pictures of two different people and one dog. Pointing to one picture, This is Cal. He 
knows all the answers to the questions his teacher asks. He is sad today because he could not find 
his favorite orange sweater to wear. He knows that his grandma knit it just for him. Pointing to 
the other picture This is Cal’s friend Mick.  Pointing to the third picture This is a dog. One day 
Cal, Mick and the dog went for a walk in the woods. While they were walking they met a wizard. 
The wizard said “abracadabra” and put Cal in the dog’s body. Now Cal is in the dog’s body. 
Mick saw everything that happened.  
Comprehension Checks: Which one looks like Cal?   
Which one is Mick?   
What did the wizard do?  
Identity Question: 
Where is Cal now? 
Subjective Questions: 
Which one now feels sad today because he couldn’t find his sweater?   
Which one now knows his grandma knit the sweater for him?  
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Which one now knows all the answers?    
Value question: 
Which one should Mick leave behind in the woods?  
Which one does Mick really want with him? 
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APPENDIX B 
SAMPLE TRANSFER SCENARIOS AND QUESTIONS FROM STUDY 2 
Sample 1: Person-to-Dog Transfer – Proper Name Condition-Boy    
Pictures of two different people and one dog. Pointing to one picture, This is Cal. He 
knows all the answers to the questions his teacher asks. He has a scrape on his knee. He is sad 
today because he could not find his favorite orange sweater to wear. He knows that his grandma 
knit it just for him. Pointing to the other picture This is Cal’s friend Mick.  Pointing to the third 
picture This is a dog. One day Cal, Mick and the dog went for a walk in the woods. While they 
were walking they met a wizard. The wizard said “abracadabra” and put Cal in the dog’s body. 
Now Cal is in the dog’s body. Mick saw everything that happened.  
Comprehension Checks: Which one looks like Cal?   
Which one is Mick?   
What did the wizard do?  
Identity Question: 
Where is Cal now?  
Subjective Questions: 
Which one now feels sad today because he couldn’t find his sweater?  
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Which one now knows his grandma knit the sweater for him?  
Which one now knows all the answers?  
Physical Identity Questions:  
Which one now has _____ hair 
Which one now is wearing a ______ shirt ? 
Which one now has a scrape on his knee?    
Irreplaceable Value Questions: 
Which one should Mick leave behind in the woods? 
Which one does Mick really want with him?  
 
Sample 2:  Person–to- Person Transfer – Trait Condition-Girl    
Pictures of three different people. Pointing to one picture, This is the nice girl. She makes 
lots of friends. She remembers going to the beach last summer with her friends. She has a scar on 
her elbow. This morning she lost her favorite doll so she is feeling sad.  Pointing to the other 
picture This is her friend.  Pointing to the third picture This is another girl. One day the girls 
went for a walk in the woods. While they were walking they met a wizard. The wizard said 
“abracadabra” and put the nice girl in the other girl’s body. Now the nice girl is in the other girl’s 
body. The friend saw everything that happened.  
Comprehension Check:  Which one looks like the nice girl?  
    Which one is the friend?  
       What did the wizard do?  
Identity Question: 
Where is the nice girl now?  
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Subjective Questions: 
Which one now feels sad because she lost her favorite doll?  
Which one now remembers going to the beach?   
Which one now makes lots of friends? 
Physical Identity Questions: 
Which one now has ______ hair?  
Which one now is wearing a _______ dress?  
Which one now has a scar on her elbow?  
Irreplaceable Value Questions: 
Which one should the friend leave behind in the woods?    
Which one does the friend really want with her? 
 
Sample 3: Person-to-Stone Scenario – Proper Name Condition - Boy 
Pictures of two different people and one stone. Pointing to one picture, This is Hank. He 
loves to eat all flavors of ice cream. He knows that when he goes to grandma’s house, he always 
gets to eat ice cream.  He stubbed his toe. He is feeling a little sick today. Pointing to the other 
picture This is Hank’s friend Nolan.  Pointing to the third picture This is a stone. One day Hank 
and Nolan took the stone and went for a walk in the woods. While they were walking they met a 
wizard. The wizard said “abracadabra” and put Hank in the stone. Now Hank is in the stone. 
Nolan saw everything that happened.  
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